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Abstract—Non-Bayesian social learning theory provides a
framework that models distributed inference for a group of
agents interacting over a social network. In this framework,
each agent iteratively forms and communicates beliefs about an
unknown state of the world with their neighbors using a learning
rule. Existing approaches assume agents have access to precise
statistical models (in the form of likelihoods) for the state of the
world. However in many situations, such models must be learned
from finite data. We propose a social learning rule that takes into
account uncertainty in the statistical models using second-order
probabilities. Therefore, beliefs derived from uncertain models
are sensitive to the amount of past evidence collected for each
hypothesis. We characterize how well the hypotheses can be tested
on a social network, as consistent or not with the state of the
world. We explicitly show the dependency of the generated beliefs
with respect to the amount of prior evidence. Moreover, as the
amount of prior evidence goes to infinity, learning occurs and is
consistent with traditional social learning theory.
Index Terms—non-Bayesian Social Learning, Uncertainty, Dis-
tributed Inference, Social Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of Non-Bayesian Social Learning [1] has gained
increasing attention over the past few years as a scalable
approach that models distributed inference of a group of agents
interacting over a social network. Individually, each agent in
the network may not be able to infer the true state of the
world. Also, agents may only observe a small fraction of the
total information, leading to conflicting beliefs. Additionally,
the agent’s measurement process or sensing modalities may
lead to ambiguous decisions, to further hinder the inference
problem. Thus, non-Bayesian social learning theory provides
a framework that allows for heterogeneous data aggregation,
enabling every agent in the network to form a consensus belief
on the true state of the world.
In this framework, each agent repeatedly forms and commu-
nicates their beliefs about an unknown state of the world with
their neighbors using a social learning rule and the likelihood
of a new observation conditioned on predefined statistical
models. The social learning rule assumes bounded rationality,
i.e., the beliefs of the agent’s neighbors are sufficient statis-
tics, also known as imperfect recall [2], which considerably
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simplifies computing the joint beliefs. Calculating the joint
beliefs does not require knowledge of the network structure,
inter-dependencies, or historical beliefs of every agent in
the network as in Bayesian social learning theory [3]–[6].
Furthermore, imperfect recall has been shown to guarantee the
agents’ beliefs converge to the global Bayesian result almost
surely [1].
One of the major assumptions in the current literature,
is that the statistical models of each hypothesis are known
precisely. This assumption requires that the agents collect a
sufficiently large set of labeled training data to accurately
model the parameters of the statistical models. However, in
some situations, (e.g. data is too expensive/impossible to
collect or the measurement process is imprecise) the agents
may only receive labeled data for a subset of states, or an
insufficient amount of training data, which leads to uncertain
model parameters.
In this work, we present a new non-Bayesian social learning
method that takes into account uncertainties in the statistical
models (i.e., hypotheses or likelihood functions). Classically,
inferences are made by normalizing the statistical models over
the set of hypotheses. In the uncertain case, the amount of
prior evidence for each hypothesis may vary, causing the
uncertain models to change significantly, making them incom-
mensurable. We propose a generalized model that reflects the
amount of prior evidence collected. We build up our results
from the concept of uncertain likelihood ratios for decision
making under uncertainty [7], [8]. This allows us to evaluate
the consistency of the prior evidence with the observation
sequence to judge each hypothesis on its own merit. We
study the convergence properties of the proposed method
for two standard social aggregating rules, log-linear [2] and
DeGroot [1]. We show that when the agents have a finite
amount of prior evidence, the agents’ beliefs asymptotically
converge to a finite value between zero and infinity, which
represents the consistency of the hypothesis with respect to
the ground truth. Furthermore, we show that we can exactly
quantify the point of convergence for update rules based on
log-linear aggregation. Finally, we show that as the amount
of prior evidence grows unboundedly, the beliefs of every
hypothesis inconsistent with the ground truth converge to zero.
This indicates that learning is possible with uncertain models
and is consistent with classical non-Bayesian social learning
theory.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First,
in Section II we present a review of the current literature in
non-Bayesian social learning theory and uncertainty modeling.
Then, we describe the problem and main results in Section
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2III. Next, we derive the uncertain statistical models in Section
IV. In Section V, we implement the uncertain models into
the log-linear update rule and formally prove the main result.
Then in Section VI, we study the properties of the DeGroot-
style update rule with the uncertain likelihood ratio. Finally,
we provide a numerical analysis in Section VII to empirically
validate our results and conclude the paper in Section VIII.
Notation: Bold symbols represent a vector/matrix, while a
non-bold symbol represents its element. We use the indexes 𝑖
and 𝑗 to represent agents, 𝑡 to constitute the time step, and 𝑘
to index the category. We use [A]𝑖𝑗 to represent the entry of
matrix A’s 𝑖th row and 𝑗th column. We denote 𝑋 𝑃→ 𝑌 to
represent that the sequence 𝑋 converges in probability to 𝑌 .
Furthermore, we abbreviate the terminology almost surely by
a.s. and independent identically distributed as i.i.d..
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Non-Bayesian Social Learning
Much of the learning algorithms developed in the literature
have been derived using distributed optimization strategies
for a group of agents, which typically utilize gradient-decent
methods [9]. These approaches construct their decentralized
algorithm using a consensus strategy [10]–[12] or a diffusion
strategy [13]–[16] to ensure that the agents learn the true
state. At the same time, non-Bayesian social learning methods
[1] were developed to perform distributed inference of a true
state using a DeGroot-style [17] (arithmetic average) learning
rule, where it has been shown in [18] that the Bayesian
learning approach is linked to the distributed optimization
framework. Since then, this learning rule has been studied
in strongly-connected and weakly-connected graphs which
characterized the beliefs rate of convergence [19] and the
effects of influential agents on the resulting beliefs [20],
respectively. Furthermore, this rule has been identified as a
boundary condition that ensures learning [2].
The DeGroot-style learning rule was then extended by a
stream of papers that studied a geometric average learning
rule known as the log-linear rule [21]–[25]. These works found
that the agents will converge to the “Bayesian Peer Influence”
heuristic [26] in finite time for fixed graphs [2], [23], time-
varying undirected graphs [27], and time-varying directed
graphs [24], [28]. Much of the focus has been on developing
learning rules that improve the convergence rate of the beliefs
[24], [28]. This has lead to the development of the log-linear
learning rule with one-step memory [22], [27], observation
reuse [29], and the accumulation of all observations [30].
However, the common assumption in the literature is that
the likelihood functions are known precisely. Thus, this paper
studies the Log-linear and DeGroot-style learning rules with
uncertain models.
B. Uncertainty Models
Modeling the uncertainty in statistical models has been
approached from many different philosophies, including pos-
sibility theory [31]–[33], probability intervals [34]–[36], and
belief theory [37], [38]. These approaches extend traditional
probability calculus to encompass uncertainty into the model
parameters. This was then extended to the theory of subjective
logic [7], which constructs a subjective belief of the model that
can be mapped into a second-order probability distribution.
Second-order probability distributions [39], [40] are typi-
cally modeled as the conjugate prior of the first-order distri-
bution, which does not complicate the overall analysis and
allows for a reduction in uncertainty as more information
becomes available. In particular, an example of a second-
order distribution is the Dirichlet distribution who’s shape
is governed by the amount of prior evidence collected. This
has led to the development of the imprecise Dirichlet process
[31], [34], [36], which allows the likelihood parameters to be
modeled within upper and lower probability bounds.
From a Bayesian point of view, this approach was also
studied by constructing the likelihood based on the posterior
predictive distribution [8], [41]. This lead to many approaches
on how to correctly construct the prior distribution to provide
non-informative information and allow the posterior distri-
butions to be data-dominated [42] (see [43] for a detailed
review). However, these studies did not consider the problem
of developing a prior based on the amount of prior information
available. In this work we utilize the Bayesian point of view
which computes the likelihood based on the posterior pre-
dictive distribution, while borrowing concepts from subjective
logic to model the prior Dirichlet distribution.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION, ALGORITHMS AND
RESULTS
A. Signals, Hypotheses, and Uncertain Models
Consider a network of 𝑚 agents interacting over a social
network, who are trying to collectively infer and agree on the
unknown state of the world 𝜃* ∈ Θ, where Θ = {𝜃1, ..., 𝜃𝑆}
is the set of possible states of the world. The agents gain
information about the state 𝜃* via a sequence of realizations
of an i.i.d. random variable conditioned on the state of the
world being 𝜃*. Thus, given such observations, the agents seek
to identify a hypothesis (i.e., a distribution for the random
variable generating the observations), that best explains the
observations and therefore the state of the world.
Each agent 𝑖 seeks to infer the underlying state of the
world 𝜃* by sequentially collecting independent private signals
{𝜔𝑖𝑡}𝑡≥1, with 𝜔𝑖𝑡 ∈ Ω = {1, . . . ,𝐾} and 𝐾 > 2 possible
mutually exclusive outcomes, where the probability of observ-
ing an outcome 𝑘 ∈ Ω is 𝜋𝑘𝑖𝜃* . Moreover, an agent keeps track
of these realizations via a histogram n𝑖𝑡 = {𝑛𝑖1𝑡, ..., 𝑛𝑖𝐾𝑡},
s.t.
∑︀𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝑡 and 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡 is the number of occurrences of
category 𝑘 up to time 𝑡.
The vector n𝑖𝑡 is a realization of 𝑡 draws from a multinomial
distribution with parameters 𝜋𝑖𝜃* . We call this distribution
𝑃𝑖𝜃* . However, our main assumption is that agents do not
have a precise statistical model for the possible states of the
world, i.e., the values of {𝜋𝑖𝜃}∀𝜃∈Θ are partially unknown
by the agents. Only limited information is available for each
possible state of the world and decisions are made over uncer-
tain likelihood models. We will assume that agents construct
these uncertain likelihood models from available prior partial
3information acquired via private signals for each possible state
of the world. For a hypothesis 𝜃, an agent 𝑖 has available
𝑅𝑖𝜃 independent trials. This provides the agent with a set of
counts r𝑖𝜃 = {𝑟𝑖1𝜃, ..., 𝑟𝑖𝐾𝜃}, denoted as the prior evidence
of hypothesis 𝜃, where 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 ∈ [0,∞) is the number of occur-
rences of outcome 𝑘 ∈ Ω and ∑︀𝐾𝑘=1 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 = 𝑅𝑖𝜃. Thus, the
vector of counts r𝑖𝜃 is a realization of a multinomial random
variable with parameters 𝑅𝑖𝜃 and 𝜋𝑖𝜃 for 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . ,𝑚} and
𝜃 ∈ Θ. Furthermore, when 𝑅𝑖𝜃 is finite (not sufficiently large),
the vector 𝜋𝑖𝜃 is uncertain, and an agent cannot compute the
probability distribution precisely.
To clarify the model above consider that an agent 𝑖 is handed
a set of 𝐾 sided dice labeled 1, ..., 𝑆. Each die 𝑠 represents
a hypothesis 𝜃𝑠 ∈ Θ and the parameters 𝜋𝑖𝜃𝑠 represents the
set of probabilities of the die landing on each face. The agent
only has access to each die for a small amount of time, where
they roll the die and collect the counts of each face during
each roll to construct the sets r𝑖𝜃 ∀𝜃 ∈ Θ. Then, all of the
dice are collected and a new unlabeled die is presented to the
agent. The goal of the agent is to identify which of the 𝑆
hypotheses best matches the distribution observed by rolling
the new die. This is the main object of study of this paper: the
design of a distributed algorithm that allows a group of agents
to construct consistent beliefs about a set of hypotheses based
on uncertain likelihood models.
B. Social Learning with Uncertain Models
Given the prior evidence for the set of hypotheses, the
sequence of private observations and the interactions with the
other agents in the network, an agent iteratively constructs
beliefs over the hypotheses set Θ. We will denote the belief of
an agent 𝑖 about a hypothesis 𝜃 at a time 𝑡 as 𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃). Moreover,
the belief of agent 𝑖 about hypothesis 𝜃 at time 𝑡+ 1 will be
a function of the tuple {r𝑖𝜃,n𝑖𝑡, {𝜇𝑗𝑡(𝜃)}𝑗∈M𝑖}, where M𝑖 is
the set of agents (or neighbors) that can send information to
agent 𝑖.
We propose the following belief update rule, based on
uncertain likelihood models,
𝜇𝑖𝑡+1(𝜃) = ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑡+1|r𝑖𝜃)
∏︁
𝑗∈M𝑖
𝜇𝑗𝑡(𝜃)
[A]𝑖𝑗 , (1)
where
ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃) = (𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 + 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 1)(𝑡+𝐾 − 1)
(𝑅𝑖𝜃 + 𝑡+𝐾 − 1)(𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 1) , (2)
𝜇𝑖0(𝜃) = 1 ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, ...,𝑚}, and [A]𝑖𝑗 is the weight agent 𝑖
assigns to the belief shared by agent 𝑗.
Equation (1) is an aggregation step (a weighted geometric
mean), and a normalized uncertain likelihood non-Bayesian
update, where Equation (2) is the uncertain likelihood ratio
update based on the observed signal at time 𝑡. This proposed
belief update rule will be motivated in Section V.
Note that the generated beliefs are not probability distribu-
tions since they are not normalized over the set of hypotheses
Θ as in traditional non-Bayesian social learning. Rather, the
generated beliefs with uncertain likelihoods represents the
consistency of the hypothesis with the ground truth given
the accumulated prior evidence. A detailed description of the
proposed inference rule will be presented in Section IV.
C. Assumptions and Definitions
The agents social interactions are modeled as an exchange
of beliefs over a weighted undirected graph 𝒢 = (M,E),
which consists of the set of agents M = {1, ...,𝑚} and a set
of edges E. An edge is defined as the connection between
agent 𝑖 and 𝑗 and is denoted by the ordered pair (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ E.
The weights along each edge form an adjacency matrix, A,
which represents the amount of influence that agent 𝑖 has on
agent 𝑗 (and vise versa) such that [A]𝑖𝑗 > 0 if (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ E
and [A]𝑖𝑗 = 0 if (𝑖, 𝑗) /∈ E. Furthermore, the set of neighbors
of agent 𝑖 is defined as M𝑖 = {𝑗 ∈ M|(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ E} and we
assume that the agents within M𝑖 report their beliefs truthfully.
Assumption III.1. The graph 𝒢 is undirected and connected.
Moreover, the corresponding adjacency matrix A is doubly
stochastic and aperiodic. Note that A is irreducible due to
connectivity.
Assumption III.1 is common among the consensus literature
and allows the agents interactions to be represented by a
Markov Chain. This guarantees convergence of the graph to
a fully connected network and defines bounds on the second
largest eigenvalue based on the number of agents [27]. Note
that it is not always possible to derive a directed graph with
a doubly stochastic adjacency matrix (as provided in [44])
especially in a distributed manner. However, if the graph
is undirected, then the distributed agents can construct a
Lazy Metropolis matrix to form a doubly stochastic matrix.
Furthermore, time-varying directed graphs can form doubly
stochastic matrices using the push-sum algorithm [45].
Assumption III.2. Each agent 𝑖 at time 𝑡 = 0 has their
counter for the observations of their private signals set to
𝑛𝑖𝑘0 = 0 for all 𝑖 ∈ M and 𝑘 ∈ Ω. This enables
the definition of the prior uncertain probability distributioñ︀𝒫𝑖(0) = { ̃︀𝑃𝑖𝜃(n𝑖0 = 0|r𝑖𝜃)}∀𝜃∈Θ at time 𝑡 = 0, which are
derived from the marginal of a second-order distribution of the
probabilities 𝜋𝑖𝜃 given the prior evidence r𝑖𝜃 (to be derived
in Section IV).
Definition III.3. When agent 𝑖 collects an infinite (or a
sufficiently large) amount of prior evidence for hypothesis 𝜃,
the probabilities 𝜋𝑖𝜃 are known precisely and we say that
the agent has a epistemically certain statistical model for the
hypothesis 𝜃, i.e., ̃︀𝒫𝑖(0) = {𝑃𝑖𝜃(n𝑖0 = 0|𝜋𝑖𝜃)}∀𝜃∈Θ.
The precise definitions of the uncertain and certain likeli-
hood models for a multinomial distribution will be formally
introduced in Section IV. Note that the usage of certain sta-
tistical models is the same as dogmatic opinions in subjective
logic [7].
We assume that the agents have calibrated their measure-
ment models to allow them to distinctly identify the categories
observed. However, it may be too expensive for the agents to
conduct a sufficient number of trials to identify the probabil-
ities 𝜋𝑖𝜃 of each hypothesis 𝜃 precisely.
Additionally, we allow the amount of prior evidence col-
lected for each hypothesis can vary between hypotheses and
agents, i.e. 𝑅𝑖𝜃 ̸= 𝑅𝑖̂︀𝜃 for any ̂︀𝜃 ̸= 𝜃 and 𝑅𝑖𝜃 ̸= 𝑅𝑗𝜃
for any 𝑖 ̸= 𝑗. This means that the distributions within
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normalizing ̃︀𝑃𝑖𝜃 over the set of ̃︀𝒫𝑖 to produce errors as an
unintended consequence. Thus, we propose to normalize each
distribution by a common vacuous probability model that
statistically models the agents ignorance of hypothesis 𝜃, i.e.,̃︀𝑃𝑖𝜃(0|r𝑖𝜃 = 0). A thorough discussion of this concept is
presented in Section IV.
Furthermore, we assume that the agent may face an identi-
fication problem due to (i) a varying amount of prior evidence
and (ii) non-informative observations. The first condition is
an effect of the proposed uncertain models, while the second
condition is caused when multiple hypotheses ̂︀Θ have the same
probability distribution as the ground truth state of the world,
s.t. ̂︀Θ = {𝜃 ∈ Θ|𝜋𝑖𝜃 = 𝜋𝑖𝜃*}. However, for every hypothesiŝ︀𝜃 ∈ ̂︀Θ, we assume that there exists another agent 𝑗 that has
informative observations for ̂︀𝜃, s.t. 𝜋𝑗𝜃 ̸= 𝜋𝑗𝜃* . Thus, the
agents must collaborate to unequivocally identify the true state
of the world.
Finally, we make the following assumption on the agents
initial beliefs for each hypothesis.
Assumption III.4. The agents initial beliefs 𝜇𝑖0(𝜃) = 1 ∀𝑖 ∈
{1, ...,𝑚} and ∀𝜃 ∈ Θ.
Assumption III.4 allows the agents to express vacuous initial
beliefs for each hypothesis based on the model of complete
ignorance achieved by normalizing the uncertain probability
distribution by the vacuous condition. This is also required to
ensure that the beliefs evolve with time.
Next, we provide a definition of the posterior probability
distribution of hypothesis 𝜃 for a centralized network.
Definition III.5. The centralized uncertain likelihood is the
determination of the probability of the observations from
all agents conditioned on the historical evidence for each
hypothesis:
̃︀𝑃𝜃(n1𝑡,n2𝑡, ...,n𝑚𝑡|r1𝜃, r2𝜃, ..., r𝑚𝜃) = 𝑚∏︁
𝑖=1
̃︀𝑃𝜃(n𝑖𝑡|r𝑖𝜃). (3)
Note that the decomposition of the centralized uncertain
likelihood as the product of uncertain probabilities is only pos-
sible because the private signals as observations or evidence
from training are statistically independent of each other and
agents do not share their evidences r𝑖𝜃. As shown latter, the
centralized uncertain likelihood and uncertain probabilities are
sensitive to the amount of evidence, and it is more meaningful
to normalize this value by the probability of the observations
conditioned on no (or vacuous) historical evidence to form the
centralized uncertain likelihood ratio:
𝑚∏︁
𝑖=1
Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑡) =
𝑚∏︁
𝑖=1
̃︀𝑃𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡|r𝑖𝜃)̃︀𝑃𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡|0) . (4)
The centralized uncertain likelihood ratio is achieved in
a centralized network where a central node observes all of
information. This distribution acts as the benchmark that the
distributed agents should strive to achieve.
D. Main Result
We now present the main result of the paper. This result
shows that the beliefs updated using the dynamics in Equation
(1) converge to a value with a one-to-one correspondence
to the centralized uncertain likelihood ratio. The theorem is
proven in Section V.
Theorem III.6. Let Assumptions III.1, III.2, and III.4 hold.
Then, the beliefs generated by the update rule (1) have the
following property
lim
𝑡→∞𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃) =
⎛⎝ 𝑚∏︁
𝑗=1
̃︀Λ𝑗𝜃
⎞⎠ 1𝑚 , a.s. (5)
where
̃︀Λ𝑗𝜃 = lim
𝑡→∞Λ𝑗𝜃(𝑡) =
𝐵(1)
𝐵(r𝑗𝜃 + 1)
𝐾∏︁
𝑘=1
(𝜋𝑗𝑘𝜃*)
𝑟𝑗𝑘𝜃 , a.s. (6)
Theorem III.6 states that the beliefs generated by the update
rule (1) converges almost surely to the 𝑚th root of the product
of the asymptotic uncertain likelihood ratio ̃︀Λ𝑖𝜃 derived in
Section IV. Thus, with an abuse of notation, we will refer to
the point of convergence of the beliefs 𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃) in the remainder
of the paper as the centralized uncertain likelihood ratio.
Note that the centralized uncertain likelihood ratio ranges
between [0,∞) depending on the amount of prior evidence
collected by the agents. When the agents have collected a
finite amount of prior evidence, the probabilities 𝜋𝑖𝜃 ∀𝑖 =
1, ..,𝑚 are uncertain, which results in the beliefs, 𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃) ∀𝑖 =
1, ...,𝑚, converging to a finite value within (0,∞). Whereas,
if the agents have collected an infinite amount of evidence,
the probabilities 𝜋𝑖𝜃 are certain (known precisely) and the
beliefs will converge to 0 or diverge to ∞. This result will be
presented in Section V.
The current literature identifies the hypothesis that mini-
mizes the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence between the cer-
tain likelihood and the ground truth distribution. This allows
only the beliefs of one hypothesis to converge to 1, while the
remaining beliefs converge to 0, which allows for learning. Our
result differs from the current literature, in that our uncertain
beliefs converge to a finite value and multiple hypotheses
may be accepted. However, when the agents are certain, only
the hypothesis with a distribution that exactly matches the
ground truth will be accepted, while any divergence between
the distributions will cause the hypothesis to be rejected. This
result follows the current literature under the closed world
assumption that one of the predefined hypotheses is the ground
truth.
Next, we will present the derivation of the uncertain likeli-
hood ratio and its properties, as well as define a test to evaluate
the consistency of each hypothesis with the private signals.
IV. UNCERTAIN MODELS DERIVATION
In this section, we derive the uncertain models as a solution
to incorporate the uncertainty about the statistical models for a
set of hypotheses. For simplicity of exposition, throughout this
section we will ignore the network, and assume the centralized
5scenario, i.e., there is only one agent. Thus, we will drop the 𝑖
in our notation. Later in Section V we will extend our results
to the distributed network setup.
A. Uncertain Likelihood Function via the Posterior Predictive
Distribution
We model the uncertainty in the parameters of the multino-
mial distribution as a second-order probability density func-
tion. Similar approaches to modeling uncertainty have been
presented in [39], [46] and [40]. As stated in Section III-A, an
agent is assumed to construct its statistical model of hypothesis
𝜃 based on the prior evidence r𝜃. Particularly, we are interested
in a modified likelihood function that captures the uncertainty
about the parameters 𝜋𝜃 for each hypothesis based on finite
samples.
Before the prior evidence r𝜃 is presented, the agent is
assumed to have uniform prior belief about {𝜋𝑘𝜃}𝐾𝑘=1, thus
{𝜋𝑘𝜃}𝐾𝑘=1 could be any point in the 𝐾-dimensional simplex,
𝒮𝐾 =
{︃
𝜋
⃒⃒⃒⃒ 𝐾∑︁
𝑘=0
𝜋𝑘 = 1 and 𝜋𝑘 > 0 for 𝑘 = 1, . . . ,𝐾
}︃
,
with equal probability. However, once r𝜃 is available, the
agent updates its beliefs and constructs a posterior belief about
{𝜋𝑘𝜃}𝐾𝑘=1. Particularly, if we assume the prior belief follows
the uniform distribution over 𝒮𝑘, and we observe r𝜃 drawn
from the multinomial distribution for hypothesis 𝜃, then the
posterior belief is
𝑓(𝜋𝜃|r𝜃) =
∏︀𝐾
𝑘=1 𝜋
𝑟𝑘𝜃
𝑘𝜃
𝐵(r𝜃 + 1)
s.t. 𝜋 ∈ 𝒮𝐾 , (7)
where 𝐵(𝛼1, ..., 𝛼𝐾) =
∏︀𝐾
𝑘=1 Γ(𝛼𝑘)/Γ(
∑︀𝐾
𝑘=1 𝛼𝑘) is the 𝐾-
dimensional Beta function [34]. The Dirichlet distribution is
the conjugate prior of the multinomial distribution, which
provides an algebraic convenience, and allows us to model
the uncertainty of each parameter in the set 𝜋𝜃 as a second-
order probability density function. Clearly, as the number of
observations in r𝜃 increases, the posterior belief concentrates
around 𝜋𝜃.
In the social learning process an agent has collected 𝑡 signals
𝜔1:𝑡 and has constructed its histogram n𝑡. If the probabilities
𝜋𝜃 are know absolutely, the agent would compute 𝑃𝜃(n𝑡|𝜋𝜃)
as its likelihood function for the signal n𝑡 given hypothesis 𝜃.
However, in the uncertain condition, we must incorporate the
finite knowledge about 𝜃 as ̃︀𝑃𝜃(n𝑡|r𝜃).
We propose the use of the posterior predictive distribution
as the likelihood in lieu of the imprecisely known likelihood
𝑃𝜃. The posterior predictive distribution accounts for the
uncertainty on 𝜋𝜃, and it is calculated by marginalizing the
distribution of n𝑡 over the possible distributions of 𝜋𝜃 given
r𝜃, i.e., ̃︀𝑃𝜃(n𝑡|r𝜃) = ∫︁
𝒮𝐾
𝑃𝜃(n𝑡|𝜋𝜃)𝑓(𝜋𝜃|r𝜃)𝑑𝜋𝜃,
=
∫︁
𝒮𝐾
𝐾∏︁
𝑘=1
𝜋𝑛𝑘𝑡𝑘𝜃 𝑓(𝜋𝜃|r𝜃)𝑑𝜋𝜃,
=
𝐵(r𝜃 + n𝑡 + 1)
𝐵(r𝜃 + 1)
. (8)
The uncertain likelihood function ̃︀𝑃𝜃 represents the probability
of the number of counts n𝑡 of each category realized by the
measurement sequence 𝜔1:𝑡 conditioned on the prior evidence
r𝜃 for hypothesis 𝜃.
B. The Effects of Normalization with Uncertain Hypotheses
Typically in Bayesian inference, a normalization step is used
to ensure that the values are between [0, 1]. Next, we will show
that an update rule generated by using the posterior predictive
distribution, as the uncertainty likelihood function, i.e.,
𝜇𝑡(𝜃) =
̃︀𝑃𝜃(n𝑡|r𝜃)𝜇0(𝜃)∑︀
𝜈∈Θ ̃︀𝑃𝜈(n𝑡|r𝜈)𝜇0(𝜈) , (9)
is not robust to having dissimilar amounts of evidence for the
different hypotheses. Thus, the following proposition holds.
Proposition IV.1. Consider the update rule (9), with 𝜇0(𝜃) >
0 ∀𝜃 ∈ Θ ∈ {𝜃*, 𝜃}. Then, there exists a finite 𝑅𝜃* and 𝑅𝜃
such that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(lim𝑡→∞ 𝜇𝑡(𝜃) > lim𝑡→∞ 𝜇𝑡(𝜃*)) > 0.
Proposition IV.1 states that due to the finite amount of
evidence collected by the agent, the ground truth hypothesis
will be rejected with a probability greater than 0. This occurs
due to the following properties. First, if an insufficient amount
of prior evidence is collected for hypothesis 𝜃 = 𝜃*, there is
a probability greater than 0 that the histograms r𝜃 generated
mismatch the ground truth parameters 𝜋𝜃* . Additionally, there
is a probability greater than 0 that the histograms generated for
a hypothesis ̂︀𝜃 ̸= 𝜃* could match the ground truth parameters.
Thus, the hypothesis ̂︀𝜃 would appear to be a better fit and be
selected over the ground truth 𝜃.
The second issue relates to the amount of prior evidence
collected. Consider that the prior evidence for each hypothesis
is consistent with their respective probability distribution, i.e.,
r𝜃 = 𝑅𝜃𝜋𝜃. However, consider that the amount of prior
evidence collected for the ground truth hypothesis, say 𝜃1,
is smaller than some hypothesis 𝜃2. Then, there is a chance
that the belief update rule (9) of 𝜃2 will be greater than 𝜃1, as
illustrated in Figure 1.
As seen in Figure 1(a), when 𝑅𝜃1 = 45 and 𝑅𝜃2 ∈
[100, 1250], lim𝑡→∞ 𝜇𝑡(𝜃2) > lim𝑡→∞ 𝜇𝑡(𝜃1), the ground
truth will be rejected. However, as the amount of prior
evidence increases to 𝑅𝜃1 = 65 in Figure 1(b) and 𝑅𝜃1 = 85
in Figure 1(c), the range of 𝑅𝜃2 that allows 𝜃1 to be rejected
decreases. Thus, there are scenarios that allow the probability
of rejecting the ground truth to be greater than 0 when using
the update rule (9). Therefore, we cannot normalize over the
set of hypotheses.
We propose that the agents compare the posterior predictive
distribution ̃︀𝑃𝜃 to the model of complete ignorance, i.e., the
vacuous probability model. The vacuous probability model
assumes that the agent has collected zero prior evidence for
each hypothesis and strictly evaluates (8) with parameters
r𝜃 = 0. This model considers that each probability 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃 is
uniformly distributed in the simplex and represents complete
uncertainty. Note that it follows from (8) that
̃︀𝑃𝜃(n𝑡|r𝜃 = 0) = 𝐵(n𝑡 + 1)
𝐵(1)
. (10)
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Fig. 1. The normalized posterior predictive distribution (8) using the update rule (9) versus the amount of evidence for hypothesis 𝜃2 when 𝜇0(𝜃1) =
𝜇0(𝜃2) = 1 and the evidence for hypothesis 𝜃1 is: (a) 𝑅𝜃1 = 45, (b) 𝑅𝜃1 = 65, and (c) 𝑅𝜃1 = 85.
Thus, we define the Uncertain Likelihood Ratio as follows.
Definition IV.2 (Uncertain Likelihood Ratio). The uncertain
likelihood ratio is the posterior predictive distribution normal-
ized by the vacuous probability model, i.e. 𝑅𝜃 = 0, as follows:
Λ𝜃(𝑡) =
̃︀𝑃𝜃(n𝑡|r𝜃)̃︀𝑃𝜃(n𝑡|0) = 𝐵(r𝜃 + n𝑡 + 1)𝐵(1)𝐵(r𝜃 + 1)𝐵(n𝑡 + 1) . (11)
Since the agent has different amounts of prior evidence
for each hypothesis, the uncertain likelihood ratio cannot be
evaluated over the set of all hypothesis as in (9). Thus, we
propose that the agent evaluates each hypothesis individually
utilizing the Uncertain Likelihood Ratio Test.
Definition IV.3 (Uncertain Likelihood Ratio Test). The uncer-
tain likelihood ratio test is a likelihood ratio test that utilizes
the uncertain likelihood ratio to evaluate the consistency of
the prior evidence of hypothesis 𝜃 with the ground truth 𝜃*.
This test results in the following conclusions:
1) If Λ𝜃(𝑡) converges to a value above one, there is
evidence to accept that 𝜃 is consistent with the ground
truth 𝜃*. Higher values indicate more evidence to accept
𝜃 as being equivalent to the ground truth.
2) If Λ𝜃(𝑡) converges to a value below one, there is
evidence to reject that 𝜃 is the ground truth 𝜃*. Lower
values indicate more evidence to reject 𝜃 as 𝜃*.
3) If Λ𝜃(𝑡) converges to a value near one, there is not
enough evidence to accept or reject 𝜃 as 𝜃*.
As a practical matter, one can define a threshold 𝜐 > 1 so
that the hypothesis is deemed accepted, rejected or unsure if
Λ𝜃(𝑡) ≥ 𝜐, Λ𝜃(𝑡) < 1/𝜐 and 1/𝜐 ≤ Λ𝜃(𝑡) < 𝜐, respectively.1
The exact choice of thresholds is application dependent to
balance the number of false positives and false negatives.
Furthermore, the choice of threshold may be chosen based
on the amount of prior evidence the agent has for hypothesis
𝜃. The construction of this threshold and its effects on the
overall inference is out of the scope of this paper and thus left
for future work.
The uncertain likelihood ratio test incorporates a third
conclusion into the traditional likelihood ratio test which is
a direct result of the agents uncertainty in the hypothesis. The
current literature assumes a closed world and that the agent
must select the hypothesis that best matches the observed
data. However, when uncertainty is incorporated, the agents
1This choice of thresholds induces a set of symmetric thresholds ± log(𝜐)
for log (Λ𝜃(𝑡)) ∈ (−∞,∞).
should judge each hypothesis on its own merits, i.e., how
well it matches the observations relative to the historical
evidence about that hypothesis. For some hypotheses, there
may not be enough evidence to accept or reject it. Furthermore,
there may be evidence to accept multiple hypotheses, but the
wrong hypothesis exhibits a larger uncertain likelihood ratio
as evident in Figure 1. Therefore, the inference problem is
reformulated to accept the following set of hypotheses:̂︀Θ = {𝜃 ∈ Θ|Λ𝜃(𝑡) > 𝜐}. (12)
C. Asymptotic Behavior of the Centralized Uncertain Likeli-
hood Ratio
The inference drawn from the uncertain likelihood ratio
test depends on the amount of prior evidence collected by
the agent. This subsection studies the asymptotic properties of
the uncertain likelihood ratio as 𝑡→∞. Particularly, we will
assume a centralized scenario where there is only one agent,
and we will observe the asymptotic behavior of its beliefs.
Lemma IV.4. The uncertain likelihood ratio in (11) of hy-
pothesis 𝜃 has the following property
̃︀Λ𝜃 = lim
𝑡→∞Λ𝜃(𝑡) =
𝐵(1)
𝐵(r𝜃 + 1)
𝐾∏︁
𝑘=1
𝜋𝑟𝑘𝜃𝑘𝜃* , a.s., (13)
where r𝜃 is the prior evidence about hypothesis 𝜃 and 𝜋𝜃*
are the ground truth probabilities.
Proof. First, the uncertain likelihood ratio can be expressed
as
Λ𝜃(𝑡) =
𝐵(1)Γ(𝑡+𝐾)
∏︀𝐾
𝑘=1 Γ(𝑟𝑘𝜃 + 𝑛𝑘𝑡 + 1)
𝐵(r𝜃 + 1)Γ(𝑅𝜃 + 𝑡+𝐾)
∏︀𝐾
𝑘=1 Γ(𝑛𝑘𝑡 + 1)
.
For a large 𝑡, we can approximate the ratio of gamma
functions using Stirling’s series [47], where
Γ(𝑥+ 𝛼)
Γ(𝑥+ 𝛽)
= 𝑥𝛼−𝛽
(︂
1 +
(𝛼− 𝛽)(𝛼− 𝛽 − 1)
2𝑥
+𝑂(𝑥−2)
)︂
.
Thus,
Γ(𝑟𝑘𝜃 + 𝑛𝑘𝑡 + 1)
Γ(𝑛𝑘𝑡 + 1)
= 𝑛𝑟𝑘𝜃𝑘𝑡
(︂
1 +
𝑟𝑘𝜃(𝑟𝑘𝜃 − 1)
2𝑛𝑘𝑡
+𝑂(𝑛−2𝑘𝑡 )
)︂
∀𝑘 ∈ Ω, and
Γ(𝑡+𝐾)
Γ(𝑡+𝐾 +𝑅𝜃)
= 𝑡−𝑅𝜃
(︂
1 +
−𝑅𝜃(−𝑅𝜃 − 1)
2𝑡
+𝑂(𝑡−2)
)︂
.
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Fig. 2. Asymptotic uncertain likelihood ratio vs. the amount of prior evidence
𝑅𝜃 for various hypothesis 𝜃 that differ from the ground truth 𝜃* with varying
degrees of divergence. These curves assume that r𝜃 = 𝑅𝜃𝜋𝜃 .
Then, the limit of the uncertain likelihood ratio as 𝑡 → ∞
becomes
lim
𝑡→∞Λ𝜃(𝑡) = lim𝑡→∞ 𝑡
−𝑅𝜃
(︂
1 +
−𝑅𝜃(−𝑅𝜃 − 1)
2𝑡
+𝑂(𝑡−2)
)︂
·
𝐾∏︁
𝑘=1
𝑛𝑟𝑘𝜃𝑘𝑡
(︂
1 +
𝑟𝑘𝜃(𝑟𝑘𝜃 − 1)
2𝑛𝑘𝑡
+𝑂(𝑛−2𝑘𝑡 )
)︂
· 𝐵(1)
𝐵(r𝜃 + 1)
.
Note that
lim
𝑡→∞
(︂
1 +
𝑟𝑘𝜃(𝑟𝑘𝜃 − 1)
2𝑛𝑘𝑡
+𝑂(𝑛−2𝑘𝑡 )
)︂
= 1,
and
lim
𝑡→∞
(︂
1 +
𝑅𝜃(𝑅𝜃 + 1)
2𝑡
+𝑂(𝑡−2)
)︂
= 1.
Then,
lim
𝑡→∞Λ𝜃(𝑡) =
𝐵(1)
𝐵(r𝜃 + 1)
𝐾∏︁
𝑘=1
𝜋𝑟𝑘𝜃𝑘𝜃* ,
with probability 1 by the strong law of large numbers.
The effect of the prior evidence on ̃︀Λ𝜃 can be seen in
Figure 2, where the asymptotic uncertain likelihood ratio vs.
the amount of prior evidence 𝑅𝜃 is presented for various
hypotheses. In this example, we consider 𝐾 = 2 and that the
ground truth probabilities are 𝜋𝜃* = {0.6, 0.4}. Each curve in
Figure 2 represents ideal conditions where the prior evidence
is r𝜃 = {𝜋, (1−𝜋)}𝑅𝜃, for 𝜋 ∈ {0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9}. This result
shows that for a finite amount of prior evidence, ̃︀Λ𝜃 converges
to a finite value between (0,∞). Additionally, this shows that
for small amounts of prior evidence, there are some hypotheses
that produce an asymptotic uncertain likelihood ratio that is
greater than 1. Although, as the amount of prior evidence
increases, the hypotheses with r𝜃𝑅𝜃 ̸= 𝜋𝜃* eventually decrease
to 0.
This result shows the effect of drawing conclusions using
uncertain models. If the agent does not have enough prior evi-
dence about a hypothesis, the asymptotic uncertain likelihood
ratio will converge to a value around 1, which falls into the
third conclusion of the uncertain likelihood ratio test. As the
amount of prior evidence increases, the asymptotic uncertain
likelihood ratio for hypotheses with a small KL divergence,
i.e., 𝐷𝐾𝐿( r𝜃𝑅𝜃 ||𝜋𝜃*) ≈ 0, will converge to a value bigger
than 1, which results in the agent accepting the hypotheses.
However, as the KL divergence and the amount of prior
evidence increases, the asymptotic uncertain likelihood ratio
converges to a value less than 1, which is therefore rejected
according to the uncertain likelihood ratio test.
Furthermore, Figure 2 provides an understanding of the
asymptotic uncertain likelihood ratio as the amount of evi-
dence increases to infinity, i.e., the agent becomes certain. This
result is analytically characterized in the following Corollary.
Corollary IV.4.1. For an infinite amount of prior evidence,
i.e., 𝑅𝜃 → ∞, the asymptotic uncertain likelihood ratio, ̃︀Λ𝜃,
diverges to
lim
𝑡→∞
̃︀Λ𝜃(𝑡) =∞ 𝑖𝑓 𝜋𝜃 = 𝜋𝜃* a.s., and (14)
converges to
lim
𝑡→∞
̃︀Λ𝜃(𝑡) = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝜋𝜃 ̸= 𝜋𝜃* a.s. (15)
Proof. First, by (13), the uncertain likelihood ratio converges
to a function of a Dirichlet distribution evaluated at the
ground truth probabilities 𝜋𝜃* , i.e., ̃︀Λ𝜃 = 𝐵(1)𝑓(𝜋𝜃* |r𝜃). The
expected value and variance of 𝑓(𝜋𝜃* |r𝜃) are 𝐸[𝜋𝑘𝜃] = 𝑟𝑘𝜃+1𝑅𝜃+𝐾
and 𝑉 𝑎𝑟[𝜋𝑘𝜃] =
(𝑟𝑘𝜃+1)(𝑅𝜃−𝑟𝑘𝜃+𝐾−1)
(𝑅𝜃+𝐾)2(𝑅𝜃+𝐾+1)
. Then, as 𝑅𝜃 → ∞,
𝐸[𝜋𝑘𝜃] → 𝜋𝑘𝜃 and 𝑉 𝑎𝑟[𝜋𝑘𝜃] → 0 a.s. due to the strong
law of large numbers. Therefore, 𝑓(𝜋𝜃* |𝑟𝜃) = 𝛿(𝜋𝑘𝜃* − 𝜋𝑘𝜃)
a.s., where 𝛿(·) is the Dirac delta function. This causes
the asymptotic uncertain likelihood ratio to diverge to ∞ if
𝜋𝜃* = 𝜋𝜃 and converge to 0 if 𝜋𝜃* ̸= 𝜋𝜃.
Corollary IV.4.1 shows the relationship of the uncertain
likelihood ratio with the assumption typically presented in
non-Bayesian social learning literature. When the amount of
prior evidence tends to infinity, the set of hypotheses with
𝜋𝜃 = 𝜋𝜃* will be accepted, while the remaining hypotheses
will be rejected since ̃︀Λ𝜃 = 0. This becomes the classical
result, except that our definition of the uncertain likelihood
ratio ranges from [0,∞) rather than [0, 1]. Therefore, our
uncertain model generalizes the certain likelihood assumption
by forming an analytical expression of the likelihood as a
function of the prior evidence.
Overall, one can view the amount of prior evidence 𝑅𝜃 as
the amount of precision for knowledge about 𝜋𝜃. Larger 𝑅𝜃
provides the opportunity for a larger uncertain likelihood ratio
as long as 𝜋𝜃 = 𝜋𝜃* . However, larger 𝑅𝜃 also means that
the uncertain likelihood ratio is more likely to drop below
one as the divergence between 𝜋𝜃 and 𝜋𝜃* increases. As
𝑅𝜃 → ∞, any small divergence is enough for the uncertain
likelihood ratio to go to zero. One could view the idea that
traditional social learning actually selects the hypothesis that
has the smallest KL divergence with the observations (e.g.,
see [24]) as an admission that the underlying models 𝜋𝜃 are
not precise enough to match the ground truth precisely. The
uncertain likelihood ratio developed in this section provides
a formal method to evaluate the hypotheses based upon that
lack of precision.
8V. DISTRIBUTED NON-BAYESIAN LEARNING WITH
UNCERTAIN MODELS
Thus far, we have derived the uncertain likelihood ratio for
an agent 𝑖 that has received a set of measurements 𝜔𝑖1:𝑡 up to
time 𝑡 > 1. However, in non-Bayesian social learning theory,
the agent’s belief 𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃) is updated using the likelihood of the
measurement 𝜔𝑖𝑡+1 given that hypothesis 𝜃 is the ground truth,
not the uncertain likelihood ratio over the entire sequence of
measurements. Therefore, in order to incorporate the uncertain
likelihood ratio into non-Bayesian social learning, we must
derive the uncertain likelihood ratio update function.
Lemma V.1. Given that agent 𝑖 receives the measurement
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘 at time 𝑡, then the uncertain likelihood ratio update
function ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃) at time 𝑡 is defined as
ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃) = (𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 + 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 + 1)
(𝑅𝑖𝜃 + 𝑡+𝐾 − 1)
(𝐾 + 𝑡− 1)
(𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 + 1)
=
̂︀𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃̂︀𝜋0 , (16)
where ̂︀𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 = 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃+𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1+1𝑅𝑖𝜃+𝑡+𝐾−1 and ̂︀𝜋0 = 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1+1𝐾+𝑡−1 are estimates
of the private signal probabilities incorporating the prior
evidence and not, respectively. This allows the uncertain
likelihood ratio to be expressed in the following recursive form
Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑡) = ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃)Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑡− 1). (17)
Proof. The uncertain likelihood ratio update is derived by
expressing Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑡) as a series of telescoping products.
Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑡) =
𝑡∏︁
𝜏=1
ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝜏−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃) =
𝑡∏︁
𝜏=1
Λ𝑖𝜃(𝜏)
Λ𝑖𝜃(𝜏 − 1) ,
since Λ𝑖𝜃(0) = 1. Therefore,
ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝜏−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃) = Λ𝑖𝜃(𝜏)
Λ𝑖𝜃(𝜏 − 1)
=
𝐵(r𝑖𝜃 + n𝑖𝜏 + 1)𝐵(n𝑖𝜏−1 + 1)
𝐵(n𝑖𝜏 + 1)𝐵(r𝑖𝜃 + n𝑖𝜏−1 + 1)
=
Γ(𝑅𝑖𝜃 +𝐾 +
∑︀𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜏−1)Γ(𝐾 +
∑︀𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜏 )
Γ(𝑅𝑖𝜃 +𝐾 +
∑︀𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜏 )Γ(𝐾 +
∑︀𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜏−1)
·
𝐾∏︁
𝑘=1
Γ(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 + 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜏 + 1)Γ(𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜏−1 + 1)
Γ(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 + 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜏−1 + 1)Γ(𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜏 + 1)
(18)
Then, if 𝜔𝑖𝜏 = 𝑘 is received, 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜏 = 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜏−1 + 1 and
𝑛𝑖?¯?𝜏 = 𝑛𝑖?¯?𝜏−1 for all 𝑘 ∈ Ω∖{𝑘}. Recall that
∑︀𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝑡.
Therefore because Γ(𝑥+ 1) = 𝑥Γ(𝑥), (18) simplifies to
ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝜏−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃) = (𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 + 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜏−1 + 1)(𝐾 + 𝜏 − 1)
(𝑅𝑖𝜃 + 𝜏 +𝐾 − 1)(𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜏−1 + 1) .
The likelihood of the measurement 𝜔𝑖𝑡+1 given that hypoth-
esis 𝜃 is the ground truth provides the following intuition. The
numerator ̂︀𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 represents the estimate of 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃 given the prior
evidence 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 and accumulated counts 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜃, while the denomi-
nator ̂︀𝜋0 represents the estimate of 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* given 0 prior evidence
and the accumulated counts 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝜃. The estimate ̂︀𝜋0 → 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* as
𝑡 → ∞ a.s. due to the strong law of large number, whereas
the estimate ̂︀𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 will converge based on the amount of prior
evidence. If the prior evidence is finite, ̂︀𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 → 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* as
𝑡 → ∞ a.s., while as 𝑅𝑖𝜃 → ∞, ̂︀𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 → 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃 ∀𝑡 > 0 a.s.
due to the strong law of large numbers. These properties are
captured in the following lemmas.
Lemma V.2. The likelihood of the measurement 𝜔𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑘
given that hypothesis 𝜃* is the ground truth has the following
properties:
1) For finite evidence 𝑅𝑖𝜃, lim𝑡→∞ ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃) = 1,
∀𝑘 ∈ Ω a.s., and
2) For infinite evidence (i.e., 𝑅𝑖𝜃 → ∞),
lim𝑡→∞ ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃) = 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* , ∀𝑘 ∈ Ω a.s..
Proof. First, since each private signal 𝜔𝑖𝜏 ∈ 𝜔𝑖1:𝑡 is i.i.d.
and drawn from the 𝐾-state multinomial distribution with
probabilities 𝜋𝑖𝜃* , the strong law of large numbers leads to
𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑡 → 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* for all 𝑘 ∈ Ω a.s. Then, since ̂︀𝜋0 = 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑡 𝑡+1𝑡+𝐾−1
and is continuous at 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* , ̂︀𝜋0(𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑡 )→ 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* with probability
1 as 𝑡 → ∞. Similarly, when the prior evidence is finite
and since ̂︀𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 = 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃+𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑡 𝑡+1𝑅𝑖𝜃+𝑡+𝐾−1 is continuous at 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* , then̂︀𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 (𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑡 )→ 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* with probability 1 as 𝑡→∞. Thus, when
the prior evidence is finite and 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* > 0, condition 1 holds.
Furthermore, if 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* = 0, the private signal 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘 will
never be received when 𝜃 = 𝜃*. Thus ̂︀𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 = ̂︀𝜋0 as they both
go to zero as 𝑡→∞ and condition 1 still holds.
When the amount of prior evidence for hypothesis 𝜃 tends
to infinity and is drawn from the distribution 𝜋𝑖𝜃, the strong
law of large numbers leads to 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃𝑅𝑖𝜃 → 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃 with probability 1.
Then, since ̂︀𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 = 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃𝑅𝑖𝜃 𝑅𝑖𝜃+𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑡 𝑡+1𝑅𝑖𝜃+𝑡+𝐾−1 is continuous at 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃𝑅𝑖𝜃 =
𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃, ̂︀𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 ( 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃𝑅𝑖𝜃 ) → 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃 with probability 1 as 𝑅𝑖𝜃 → ∞.
Then, as 𝑡 → ∞, ̂︀𝜋0(𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑡 ) → 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* with probability 1 as
stated above. Therefore condition 2 holds. When 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* = 0,
the likelihood ratio goes to infinity, but the private signal 𝜔𝑖𝑡 =
𝑘 will never be received as 𝜃* is the ground truth.
This immediately results in the following corollary.
Corollary V.2.1. When the agent is certain, i.e., 𝑅𝑖𝜃 → ∞,
and r𝑖𝜃 is drawn from the distribution 𝜋𝑖𝜃 = 𝜋𝑖𝜃* , then the
likelihood update of the measurement 𝜔𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑘 converges to
lim
𝑡→∞,𝑅𝑖𝜃→∞
ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑡+1|r𝑖𝜃) = 1, a.s. (19)
The above lemma and corollary show that modeling with
uncertainty results in a likelihood function that varies with
time. Furthermore, Lemma V.2 condition 2 and Corollary V.2.1
show that in the certain case, the numerator of the likelihood
function is a constant and is modeled in the same manner as
the traditional non-Bayesian social learning theory. Thus, the
proposed uncertain likelihood ratio translates to a likelihood
function that models uncertain and certain conditions based
on the amount of prior evidence.
Therefore, at time 𝑡 > 1, agent 𝑖 will combine their
neighbors’ beliefs of hypothesis 𝜃 at time 𝑡 and update their
belief of 𝜃 using the likelihood update (2) of the private signal
at time 𝑡 + 1 according to (1). Then, the agent can interpret
hypothesis 𝜃 using the uncertain likelihood ratio test, except
Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑡) is now replaced with the agents belief 𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃).
9A. Asymptotic Behavior on Arbitrary Graphs
Next, we present the proof of main results in Theorem III.6.
First, we begin by providing three auxiliary lemmas. The first
lemma provides a result about the convergence of a product
of doubly stochastic matrices provided in [27].
Lemma V.3 (Lemma 5 in [27]). For a stationary doubly
stochastic matrix, we have for all 𝑡 > 0⃦⃦⃦⃦
A𝑡 − 1
𝑚
11′
⃦⃦⃦⃦
6
√
2𝑚𝜆𝑡 (20)
where ‖ · ‖ is the spectral norm, 𝜆 = 1 − 𝜂4𝑚2 , and 𝜂 is a
positive constant s.t. if 𝐴𝑖𝑗 > 0, then 𝐴𝑖𝑗 > 𝜂.
The above lemma shows that every element of a repeated
product of a doubly stochastic matrices will converge to 1/𝑚.
Next, we present the bounds of the likelihood update to show
that ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔𝑖𝑡) is bounded.
Lemma V.4. For an uncertain likelihood, i.e., 𝑅𝑖𝜃 < ∞, the
likelihood update is bounded as follows.
1
𝑅𝑖𝜃 +𝐾
6 ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜔𝑖𝑡|r𝑖𝜃) 6 max
𝑘∈Ω
(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃) + 1. (21)
Proof. Consider that the agent 𝑖 has received 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 ∈ [0, 𝑡−1]
private signals for attribute 𝑘 and 𝑛𝑖?¯?𝑡−1 = 𝑡− 1−𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 for
other signals up to time 𝑡 − 1 where 𝑘 = Ω ∖ {𝑘}. Then, if
agent 𝑖 receives 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘 at time 𝑡, the log of the likelihood
update is
log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃) = log ((𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 + 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 + 1)(𝑡+𝐾 − 1))
− log ((𝑅𝑖𝜃 + 𝑡+𝐾 − 1)(𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 + 1)) .
The partial derivatives of the update with respect to 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 is
𝜕 log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃))
𝜕𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1
=
1
(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 + 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 + 1)
− 1
(𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 + 1)
=
−𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃
(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 + 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 + 1)(𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 + 1)
< 0.
Therefore, since the function log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃)) is
monotonically decreasing with respect to 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1, the maxi-
mum and minimum occur at 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 = 0 and 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 = 𝑡− 1,
respectively. To maximize the update, setting 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 = 0 leads
to
log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃)) = log ((𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 + 1)(𝑡+𝐾 − 1))
− log ((𝑅𝑖𝜃 + 𝑡+𝐾 − 1))
so that the derivative of the log-update with respect to 𝑡 is
𝑑 log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃))
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑅𝑖𝜃
(𝑅𝑖𝜃 + 𝑡+𝐾 − 1)(𝑡+𝐾 − 1) > 0.
So the update is maximized by letting 𝑡 → ∞
so that log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃)) 6 log(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 + 1) 6
log (max𝑘∈Ω(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃) + 1). Now to minimize the update, setting
𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 = 𝑡− 1 leads to
log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃)) = log ((𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 + 𝑡)(𝑡+𝐾 − 1))
− log ((𝑅𝑖𝜃 + 𝑡+𝐾 − 1)𝑡) .
Now log(𝑡+𝐾−1)− log(𝑡) > 0 and log(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃+𝑡)− log(𝑅𝑖𝜃+
𝑡+𝐾−1) is minimized over 𝑡 > 1 at 𝑡 = 1 so that log(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃+
𝑡)− log(𝑅𝑖𝜃 + 𝑡+𝐾 − 1) > log(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝜃 +1)− log(𝑅𝑖𝜃 +𝐾) >
− log(𝑅𝑖𝜃 +𝐾). Thus, log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃)) > − log(𝑅𝑖𝜃 +
𝐾) for all 𝑘 ∈ Ω.
Finally, we recall Lemma 3.1 from [48], which provides a
convergence property of scalar sequences.
Lemma V.5 (Lemma 3.1 in [48]). Let {𝛾𝑘} be a scalar
sequence. If lim𝑘→∞ 𝛾𝑘 = 𝛾 and 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1, then
lim𝑘→∞
∑︀𝑘
𝑙=0 𝛽
𝑘−𝑙𝛾𝑙 = 𝛾1−𝛽 .
Proof of Theorem III.6. With the above lemmas stated, we
can now prove Theorem III.6. First, we prove that the beliefs
converge to the 𝑚th root of the product of uncertain likelihood
ratios, i.e.,
lim
𝑡→∞
⃦⃦⃦⃦
⃦log(𝜇𝑡(𝜃))− log
(︃
(
𝑚∏︁
𝑖=1
Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑡))
1
𝑚
)︃
1
⃦⃦⃦⃦
⃦ = 0, (22)
where for vectors ‖ · ‖ is the standard 2-norm. Thus, since
log(𝜇𝑡(𝜃)) =
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=1
A𝑡−𝜏 log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 )) , and
log
(︃
(
𝑚∏︁
𝑖=1
Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑡))
1
𝑚
)︃
1 =
1
𝑚
11′
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=1
log(ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 )),
(23)
where with a slight abuse of notation, ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 ) =
[ℓ1𝜃(n1𝜏−1, 𝜔1𝜏 |r1𝜃), ..., ℓ𝑚𝜃(n𝑚𝜏−1, 𝜔𝑚𝜏 |r𝑚𝜃)]′, (22) can be
rewritten as
⃦⃦⃦⃦
⃦log(𝜇𝑡(𝜃))− log
(︃
(
𝑚∏︁
𝑖=1
Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑡))
1
𝑚
)︃
1
⃦⃦⃦⃦
⃦ 6
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=1
⃦⃦⃦⃦
A𝑡−𝜏 − 1
𝑚
11′
⃦⃦⃦⃦
‖log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 ))‖ 6
√
2𝑚
(︃
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=0
𝜆𝑡−𝜏 ‖log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 ))‖ − 𝜆𝑡 ‖log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔0))‖
)︃
, (24)
where (24) follows from Lemma V.3. Furthermore, since
lim𝑡→∞ ‖log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔0))‖ = 0 a.s. from Lemma V.2, then
lim
𝑡→∞
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=0
𝜆𝑡−𝜏 ‖log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 ))‖ = 0
a.s. from Lemma V.5. Finally, since 𝜆 < 1 and ‖log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔0))‖
is bounded according to Lemma V.4
lim
𝑡→∞𝜆
𝑡 ‖log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔0))‖ = 0 a.s..
Then, by the continuity of the logarithmic function, this
implies that lim𝑡→∞ 𝜇𝑡(𝜃)/
(︁∏︀𝑚
𝑗=1 Λ𝑗𝜃(𝑡)
)︁1/𝑚
= 1 a.s. and
the desired result is achieved.
B. Learning with Certain Likelihoods
Next, we present the results for when the agents are certain,
i.e., 𝑅𝑖𝜃 → ∞. First, we will consider the scenario when
hypothesis 𝜃 is the ground truth for all agents, i.e., 𝜋𝑖𝜃 = 𝜋𝑖𝜃*
∀𝑖 ∈M. Then, we will present the condition when hypothesis
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𝜃 is not the ground truth for at least one agent 𝑖, i.e., 𝜋𝑖𝜃 ̸=
𝜋𝑖𝜃* .
Corollary V.5.1. Let Assumptions III.1 and III.4 hold and
𝜋𝑖𝜃 = 𝜋𝑖𝜃* ∀𝑖 ∈ M. Then, the beliefs generated using the
update rule (1) with infinite evidence diverge to the following.
lim
𝑡→∞𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃) =∞, a.s. (25)
Proof. By Corollary V.2.1, lim𝑡→∞ ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜔𝑖𝑡|r𝑖𝜃) = 1
a.s.. As a result, the proof of Theorem III.6 still applies and
𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃) = (
∏︀𝑚
𝑖=1 Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑡))
1
𝑚 as 𝑡→∞ with probability 1. Now
by Lemma IV.4.1, Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑡) = ∞ for each 𝑖 as 𝑡 → ∞ and
𝑅𝑖𝜃 → ∞. Thus, the geometric mean is also diverging to ∞
a.s..
Lemma V.6. Let Assumption III.1 and III.4 hold and at least
one agent 𝑖 ∈ M has a set of probabilities s.t. 𝜋𝑖𝜃 ̸= 𝜋𝑖𝜃* .
Then, the beliefs generated by the update rule (1) allow for
learning, i.e., they converge in probability to
𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃)
𝑃→ 0. (26)
Before proving Lemma V.6, we must first present the
following lemma which provides an upper bound of the certain
likelihood update.
Lemma V.7. For a finite time 𝑡, the certain likelihood update
is bounded above by
ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜔𝑖𝑡|r𝑖𝜃) 6 (𝑡+𝐾 − 1) <∞ (27)
Proof. First, by inspection of (16) for the certain condition
such that ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜔𝑖𝑡|r𝑖𝜃) = 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃 𝑡+𝐾−1𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1+1 , it is clear that
the maximum occurs when an attribute 𝑘 ∈ Ω has not been
received up to time 𝑡 − 1. In other words, the term 𝑡+𝐾−1𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1+1
is maximized when 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 = 0, resulting in the likelihood
update being bounded by (𝑡+𝐾 − 1) because 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃 6 1. For
any finite value of 𝑡 this value is the highest possible value
for the update.
Now that the likelihood update is shown to be bounded by
a finite value for finite 𝑡, we can now prove Lemma V.6.
Proof of Lemma V.6. Starting with (23) the log-beliefs 𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃)
can be written as
log(𝜇𝑡(𝜃)) =
𝑇∑︁
𝜏=1
A𝑡−𝜏 log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 ))
+
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=𝑇+1
(︂
A𝑡−𝜏 − 1
𝑚
11′
)︂
log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 ))
+
1
𝑚
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=𝑇+1
11′ log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 )) . (28)
Now because A is doubly stochastic, ‖A‖ = 1 and the norm
of the first term in the right hand side of (28) is bounded by⃦⃦⃦⃦
⃦
𝑇∑︁
𝜏=1
A𝑡−𝜏 log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 ))
⃦⃦⃦⃦
⃦ ≤
𝑇∑︁
𝜏=1
‖log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 ))‖
≤
𝑇∑︁
𝜏=1
√
𝑚(𝜏 +𝐾 − 1)
=
√
𝑚𝑇
(︂
1
2
(𝑇 + 1) + (𝐾 − 1)
)︂
,
where the second line is the result of the upper bound for the
possible update value given in Lemma V.7. As long as 𝑇 is
finite this first term is finite.
By Lemma V.2, log (ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝜏−1, 𝜔𝜏 |r𝑖𝜃)) → log
(︁
𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃*
)︁
a.s., and so for any 𝜖 > 0 and 𝛿 > 0 there exist a finite value
𝑇 such that | log (ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝜏−1, 𝜔𝜏 |r𝑖𝜃))− log
(︁
𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃*
)︁
| < 𝜖 with
probability greater than 1 − 𝛿. Thus the second term on the
right hand side of (28) with probability greater than 1 − 𝛿 is
bounded by⃦⃦⃦⃦
⃦
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=𝑇+1
(︂
A𝑡−𝜏 − 1
𝑚
11′
)︂
log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 ))
⃦⃦⃦⃦
⃦
≤
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=𝑇+1
⃦⃦⃦⃦
A𝑡−𝜏 − 1
𝑚
11′
⃦⃦⃦⃦
‖log (ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝜏 ))‖
≤
√
2𝑚
(︃
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=𝑇+1
𝜆𝑡−𝜏
)︃
(𝐿+ 𝜖) ≤
√
2𝑚
(1− 𝜆) (𝐿+ 𝜖),
where 𝐿 = max𝑖,𝑘∈Ω*𝑖
⃒⃒⃒
log
(︁
𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃*
)︁⃒⃒⃒
is the largest converged
value that is realizable, i.e, Ω*𝑖 is the set of all 𝑘 values such
that 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* > 0. Because 𝐿 is finite, the second term in (28) is
also finite.
Finally, each element for the third term on the right hand
side of (28) can be reexpressed as
1
𝑚
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=𝑇+1
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
log (ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝜏−1, 𝜔𝑖𝜏 |r𝑖𝜃))
=
1
𝑚
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=𝑇+1
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
(︂
log
(︂
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝜏𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝜏𝜃*
)︂
+ 𝑒𝑖𝜏
)︂
,
≤ (𝑡− 𝑇 )
(︃
1
(𝑡− 𝑇 )
(︃
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=𝑇+1
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
log
(︂
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝜏𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝜏𝜃*
)︂)︃
+ 𝜖
)︃
,
(29)
where 𝑒𝑖𝜏 = log (ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝜏−1, 𝜔𝑖𝜏 |r𝑖𝜃)) − log
(︁
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝜏 𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝜏 𝜃*
)︁
is the
error and |𝑒𝑖𝜏 | 6 𝜖, which leads to the second line. Due the
strong law of large numbers, the bound for the third term
converges with probability one to
(𝑡− 𝑇 )
(︃
− 1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝜋𝑖𝜃* ||𝜋𝑖𝜃) + 𝜖
)︃
. (30)
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In other words, for 𝑡 sufficiently large with probability 1− 𝛿
log(𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃)) ≤
√
𝑚
𝑇
2
(𝑇 + 1) + 𝑇 (𝐾 − 1) +
√
2𝑚
(1− 𝜆) (𝐿+ 𝜖)
+(𝑡− 𝑇 )
(︃
− 1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝜋𝑖𝜃* ||𝜋𝑖𝜃) + 2𝜖
)︃
Since 1𝑚
∑︀𝑚
𝑖=1𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝜋𝑖𝜃* ||𝜋𝑖𝜃) > 0 as 𝜋𝜃* ̸= 𝜋𝜃, and 𝜖
can be made smaller by making 𝑇 larger, the upper bound
is diverging to −∞ as 𝑡 increases. Thus, the log-belief is
diverging to −∞ as 𝑡 → ∞. Because the exponential is
continuous, the beliefs converge in probability to zero.
Corollary V.5.1 and Lemma V.6 show that in order for the
agents to learn the ground truth precisely, all of the agents must
have certain probability distributions that match the ground
truth exactly. While if a single agent disagrees, then the beliefs
will converge to 0. Therefore, this result is consistent with
the traditional non-Bayesian social learning literature except
that the hypothesis that matches the ground truth diverges to
infinity instead of converging to 1. Thus, the design of the
uncertain likelihood ratio still preserves the consensus result
while allowing the agents to consider uncertain scenarios.
After expanding the beta functions and applying Stirling’s
approximation, it can be shown that the certain likelihood ratio
for large 𝑡 behaves as
Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑡
𝛼𝑒−𝑡𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝜋𝑖𝜃* ||𝜋𝑖𝜃), (31)
where 𝐶 and 𝛼 are constants. Note that in the centalized
uncertain likelihood ratio is the product of the individual
uncertain likelihood ratios. Without any divergence between
𝜋𝑖𝜃 and 𝜋𝑖𝜃* for all agents, the uncertain likelihood ratio goes
to infinity sub-exponentially as 𝑡𝛼. It only takes any divergence
between 𝜋𝑖𝜃 and 𝜋𝑖𝜃* at a single agent to drive the centralized
uncertain likelihood ratio to zero as the decay to zero is
exponential. Essentially, a hypothesis 𝜃 that is consistent with
the observations can never be declared as the absolute ground
truth as any new certain agent whose model for that hypothesis
is inconsistent with their observation would drive the uncertain
likelihood ratio to zero. Rather, one can only state that the
hypothesis is consistent with the ground truth as no counter
example has been observed. On the other hand, once a counter
example is found by any agent, one can state unequivocally
that the hypothesis is not the ground truth. No finite number
of agents such that 𝜋𝑖𝜃 = 𝜋𝑖𝜃* can drive the belief to be
non-zero.
For the more general uncertain case, the updates ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔𝑖𝑡)
as given by (16) begin as ratios of the expected value of 𝜋𝑖𝜃
based upon the prior evidence r𝑖𝜃 over that based upon the
observations n𝑖𝑡 . As time evolves, the numerator of the ratio
transitions from an estimate of 𝜋𝑖𝜃 to that of 𝜋𝑖𝜃* . On the
other hand, the denominator is going to an estimate of 𝜋𝑖𝜃* .
The larger the amount of prior evidence 𝑅𝑖𝜃, the longer it
takes for the transition to occur. Before the transition, the
uncertain likelihood ratio behaves like the certain case. After
the transition, the updates converge to one, which cause the
uncertain likelihood ratio to level out. If 𝜃 ̸= 𝜃*, whether or
not the uncertain likelihood ratio converges to a value larger
or less than one depends on whether or not the divergence
between the 𝜋’s is able to overwhelm the 𝑡𝛼 growth before
the updates become close to one. This in turn depends on
the amount of prior evidence. Less prior evidence means that
𝜃 may not be distinguished from 𝜃* given the precision of
the evidence. The simulations in Section VII will demonstrate
these properties.
VI. THE EFFECTS OF DEGROOT AGGREGATION FOR
UNCERTAIN MODELS
Next, we will consider a DeGroot-style update rule and
present the effects of the beliefs with uncertain likelihood
models. The DeGroot-style update rule consists of taking the
weighted arithmetic average of the agents prior beliefs instead
of the geometric average. Thus, the DeGroot-style update rule
with uncertain likelihood models is defined as,
𝜇𝑖𝑡+1(𝜃) = ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑡+1|r𝑖𝜃)
∑︁
𝑗∈M𝑖
[A]𝑖𝑗𝜇𝑗𝑡(𝜃). (32)
First, let us consider the asymptotic properties of the beliefs
generated using the update rule (32) with a finite amount of
prior evidence.
Lemma VI.1. Let Assumptions III.1, III.2, and III.4 hold.
Then, the beliefs generated using the update rule (32) have
the following property with probability 1:
lim
𝑡→∞𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃) >
(︃
𝑚∏︁
𝑖=1
Λ˜𝑖𝜃
)︃ 1
𝑚
. (33)
Proof. To prove this, we will first compare the beliefs gen-
erated from the update rule (32), denoted 𝜇[𝐷𝐺]𝑡 (𝜃), with the
beliefs generated for the update rule (1), denoted 𝜇[𝐿𝐿]𝑡 (𝜃).
Then, by induction, we have the following. At 𝑡 = 0, the
agents beliefs are initialized to the same value, 𝜇[𝐷𝐺]0 (𝜃) =
𝜇
[𝐿𝐿]
0 (𝜃) = 1 and 𝜇
[𝐷𝐺]
0 (𝜃) > 𝜇
[𝐿𝐿]
0 (𝜃) is true. Given that
𝜇
[𝐷𝐺]
𝑡−1 (𝜃) > 𝜇
[𝐿𝐿]
𝑡−1 (𝜃) is true for time 𝑡 − 1, the log of the
beliefs from the DeGroot and LL rules ag time 𝑡 respectively
becomes
log(𝜇
[𝐷𝐺]
𝑖𝑡 (𝜃)) = log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑡+1|r𝑖𝜃))
+ log
⎛⎝ 𝑚∑︁
𝑗=1
[A]𝑖𝑗𝜇
[𝐷𝐺]
𝑗𝑡−1(𝜃)
⎞⎠ ,
log(𝜇
[𝐿𝐿]
𝑖𝑡 (𝜃)) = log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑡+1|r𝑖𝜃))
+
𝑚∑︁
𝑗=1
[A]𝑖𝑗 log
(︁
𝜇
[𝐿𝐿]
𝑗𝑡−1(𝜃)
)︁
Using Jensen’s inequality, log(
∑︀𝑚
𝑗=1[A]𝑖𝑗𝜇
[𝐷𝐺]
𝑗𝑡−1(𝜃)) >∑︀𝑚
𝑗=1[A]𝑖𝑗 log(𝜇
[𝐷𝐺]
𝑗𝑡−1(𝜃)) since the logarithm is a
concave function. Since
∑︀𝑚
𝑗=1[A]𝑖𝑗 log(𝜇
[𝐷𝐺]
𝑗𝑡−1(𝜃)) >∑︀𝑚
𝑗=1[A]𝑖𝑗 log(𝜇
[𝐿𝐿]
𝑗𝑡−1(𝜃)), 𝜇
[𝐷𝐺]
𝑡 (𝜃) > 𝜇
[𝐿𝐿]
𝑡 (𝜃). By
induction, 𝜇[𝐷𝐺]𝑡 (𝜃) > 𝜇
[𝐿𝐿]
𝑡 (𝜃) is true ∀𝑡 > 0, and
asymptotically we can say that
lim
𝑡→∞𝜇
[𝐷𝐺]
𝑖𝑡 (𝜃) > lim𝑡→∞𝜇
[𝐿𝐿]
𝑖𝑡 (𝜃) =
(︃
𝑚∏︁
𝑖=1
Λ˜𝑖𝜃
)︃ 1
𝑚
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with probability 1.
Lemma VI.1 shows that the beliefs generated from the
DeGroot-style update rule will always be greater than or equal
to the 𝑚th root of the centralized uncertain likelihood ratio.
This means that the interpretation of the beliefs using the
update rule (1) and the DeGroot rule (32) are not the same.
Nevertheless the simulations in Section VII demonstrates that
the DeGroot rule reaches consensus but is non-commutative
because the order in which the private signals are received af-
fects where the belief converges. Thus, a further understanding
of the beliefs point of convergence is necessary to identify
thresholds that allow for the use of the uncertain likelihood
ratio test. This will be studied as a future work.
The certain likelihood conditions presented next indicate
that the DeGroot rule still enables learning. Additionally, we
derive the beliefs asymptotic convergence rate for a fully
connected network and show that learning with the update rule
(32) is slower than learning with (1). First, noting the result
of the uncertain DeGroot-style update rule, we can conclude
the following corollary.
Corollary VI.1.1. Let Assumptions III.1 and III.4 hold and
𝜋𝑖𝜃 = 𝜋𝑖𝜃* ∀𝑖 ∈ M. Then, the beliefs generated using the
update rule (32) and infinite evidence diverge to the following.
lim
𝑡→∞𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃) =∞, a.s. (34)
Proof. This can be directly seen from Lemma VI.1 and
Corollary V.5.1.
Next, we will derive the point of convergence when at least
one agent 𝑖 has a certain set of probabilities s.t. 𝜋𝑖𝜃 ̸= 𝜋𝑖𝜃* .
First, we provide the following lemma that describes the
properties of the beliefs updated using the DeGroot-style
learning rule for a fully connected network.
Lemma VI.2. Let Assumption III.4 hold, the network graph
be fully connected, i.e. A = 1𝑚11
′, and there exists a 𝜃 s.t.
𝜋𝑖𝜃 ̸= 𝜋𝑖𝜃* for at least one agent 𝑖. Then, the beliefs generated
by the update rule (32) with infinite evidence asymptotically
convergence to zero at a geometric rate determined by the
Centralized Average (CA) divergence, i.e., for all 𝑖 ∈M
lim
𝑡→∞
1
𝑡
𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃) = −𝐷𝐶𝐴(Π𝜃* ||Π𝜃), (35)
where
𝐷𝐶𝐴(Π𝜃* ||Π𝜃) = −
𝐾∑︁
𝑘1=1
· · ·
𝐾∑︁
𝑘𝑚=1
𝜋1𝑘1𝜃* · · ·𝜋𝑚𝑘𝑚𝜃*
· log
(︂
1
𝑚
(︂
𝜋1𝑘1𝜃
𝜋1𝑘1𝜃*
+ · · ·+ 𝜋𝑚𝑘𝑚𝜃
𝜋𝑚𝑘𝑚𝜃*
)︂)︂
(36)
and Π𝜃 = {𝜋𝑖𝜃}∀𝑖∈M is the set of probabilities of all agents.
Proof. First, from Lemma V.2 condition 2, the likelihood
updates converge to the ratio of the probabilities for 𝜃 and 𝜃*.
Since the logarithm and average operations are continuous, we
know that for any 𝜖 > 0 and 𝛿 > 0, there exists a finite 𝑇 s.t.
for 𝑡 > 𝑇 the log average likelihood update is bounded as⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒log
(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1𝜔𝑖𝑡|r𝑖𝜃)
)︃
− log
(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝑡𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝑡𝜃*
)︃⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒ ≤ 𝜖
with probability at least 1 − 𝛿. Also, we know that 𝜇𝑇 (𝜃)
is bounded since ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜔𝑖𝑡|r𝑖𝜃) is bound by Lemma V.7
and converging to within ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑘|r𝑖𝜃) < 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃* + 𝜖 with
probability at least 1−𝛿. Now, the beliefs generated using the
update rule (32) at times times 𝑡 and 𝑇 are related as
𝜇𝑡(𝜃) = L𝜃(𝜔𝑡)AL𝜃(𝜔𝑡−1) · · ·AL𝜃(𝜔𝑇+1)A𝜇𝑇 (𝜃)
= L𝜃(𝜔𝑡)
1
𝑚
11′L𝜃(𝜔𝑡−1) · · · 1
𝑚
11′L𝜃(𝜔𝑇+1)
·
(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜇𝑖𝑇 (𝜃)
)︃
1
=
𝑡∏︁
𝜏=𝑇+1
(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝜏−1𝜔𝑖𝜏 |r𝑖𝜃)
)︃(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜇𝑖𝑇 (𝜃)
)︃
(37)
where L𝜃(𝜔𝜏 ) = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(ℓ1𝜃(n1𝜏−1, 𝜔1𝜏 |r1𝜃), ...,
ℓ𝑚𝜃(n𝑚𝜏−1, 𝜔𝑚𝜏 |r𝑚𝜃)). We then take the logarithm of
both sides of the above equation and use the knowledge that
the log-updates are bounded in probability to determine that
the bounds with probability at least 1 − 𝛿 for the log-beliefs
are
𝐺(𝑡;𝑇 )− (𝑡− 𝑇 )𝜖 ≤ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝜇𝑡(𝜃)) ≤ 𝐺(𝑡;𝑇 ) + (𝑡− 𝑇 )𝜖,
where
𝐺(𝑡;𝑇 ) = log
(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜇𝑖𝑇 (𝜃)
)︃
+
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=𝑇+1
log
(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝜏𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝜏𝜃*
)︃
.
Note that the first term 𝐺(𝑡, 𝑇 ) is finite and constant with
respect to 𝑡. Using the law of large numbers the asymptotic
convergence rate is bounded with probability at least 1− 𝛿 as
𝐷𝐶𝐴(Π𝜃* ||Π𝜃)−𝜖 ≤ − lim
𝑡→∞
1
𝑡
log (𝜇𝑡(𝜃)) ≤ 𝐷𝐶𝐴(Π𝜃* ||Π𝜃)+𝜖.
Note that 𝜖 can be made arbitrarily small by setting 𝑇 larger.
Thus, the convergence rate converges in probability to
lim
𝑡→∞
1
𝑡
log (𝜇𝑡(𝜃)) = −𝐷𝐶𝐴(Π𝜃* ||Π𝜃).
This shows that even for the DeGroot-style rule, any diver-
gence between 𝜋𝑖𝜃 and 𝜋𝑖𝜃* causes the beliefs to decrease at
a rate larger than the sub-exponential growth rate. This is state
formally in the following corollary.
Corollary VI.2.1. Let Assumption III.4 hold and the network
graph be fully connected, i.e., A = 1𝑚11
′, and at least one
agent 𝑖 has a set of probabilities s.t. 𝜋𝑖𝜃 ̸= 𝜋𝑖𝜃* . Then, the
beliefs generated by the update rule (32) with infinite evidence
allows for learning, i.e., they converge in probability to
lim
𝑡→∞𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃) = 0. (38)
Now, let us compare this result to a network updating their
beliefs using the log-linear rule (1) in the following lemma.
Lemma VI.3. Assuming a network with a doubly stochastic
aperiodic matrix A and a certain set of probabilities such
that there exists a 𝜃 s.t. 𝜋𝑖𝜃 ̸= 𝜋𝑖𝜃* for at least one agent
𝑖, the log-linear beliefs (1) converge in probability to zero at
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a geometric rate determined by the average Kullback-Leibler
divergence, i.e.,
lim
𝑡→∞
1
𝑡
log (𝜇𝑡(𝜃)) = −
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝜋𝑖𝜃* ||𝜋𝑖𝜃). (39)
for 𝑖 ∈M. Furthermore, this convergence rate is faster than
that of the DeGroot rule (32) for a fully connected graph where
A = 1𝑚11
′, i.e.,
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝜋𝑖𝜃* ||𝜋𝑖𝜃) > 𝐷𝐶𝐴(Π𝜃* ||Π𝜃) > 0. (40)
Proof. The proof of Lemma V.6 provides the starting point to
prove the first part of this theorem. The log belief at time 𝑡
is expressed by (28). For any 𝜖 > 0 and 𝛿 > 0 there exists a
value of 𝑇 such that the first two terms on the right side of
(28) are constant with respect to 𝑡 and finite with probability
at least 1−𝛿. The upper bound for third term is given by (29).
By the same argument to get to this upper bound, it is clear
that the lower bound can be given by replacing 𝜖 with −𝜖, and
thus with probability at least 1− 𝛿,⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒log (𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃))− 𝐶 +
(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑡∑︁
𝜏=𝑇+1
log
(︂
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝜏𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝜏𝜃*
)︂)︃⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒ ≤ 𝜖 (41)
for any 𝑖 ∈ M where 𝐶 represents the finite constant
incorporating the first two terms in (28). As 𝑡 → ∞, the law
of large numbers leads to the bounds for convergence rate as
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝜋𝑖𝜃* ||𝜋𝑖𝜃)− 𝜖 ≤ − lim
𝑡→∞ log (𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃))
≤ 1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝜋𝑖𝜃* ||𝜋𝑖𝜃) + 𝜖. (42)
Note that 𝜖 can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the
value of 𝑇 in (28); thus proving the first part of the theorem.
Next, we will prove (40). First, we prove that the CA di-
vergence is non-negative using Jensen’s inequality as follows:
𝐷𝐶𝐴(Π𝜃* ||Π𝜃) = −𝐸𝜃*
[︃
log
(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜋𝑖𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝜃*
)︃]︃
,
> log
(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝐸𝜃
*
[︂
𝜋𝑖𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝜃*
]︂)︃
,
= log(1) = 0, (43)
with equality only when 𝜋𝑖𝜃 = 𝜋𝑖𝜃* , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 . Then, we
prove that the CA divergence is upper bounded by the average
Kullback-Leibler divergence using Jensen’s inequality, i.e.,
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝜋𝑖𝜃* ||𝜋𝑖𝜃) = −𝐸𝜃*
[︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
log
(︂
𝜋𝑖𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝜃*
)︂]︃
> −𝐸𝜃*
[︃
log
(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜋𝑖𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝜃*
)︃]︃
= 𝐷𝐶𝐴(Π𝜃* ||Π𝜃). (44)
with equality only when 𝜋𝑖𝜃 = 𝜋𝑖𝜃* , ∀𝑖 ∈M.
These results indicate that the DeGroot-style update rule
learns that a hypothesis is not the ground truth at a slower
rate than the log-linear update rule (1). Additionally, we found
(through empirical evaluation) that the DeGroot belief for
uncertain likelihood models reach a consensus and converge
to finite value as the simulations in Section VII indicates. This
is because the uncertain likelihood ratio update functions ℓ𝑖𝜃
are converging to one. For the certain likelihood condition,
the DeGroot rule allows for learning for a fully connected
network, as shown in Corollaries VI.1.1 and VI.2.1. Actually,
the DeGroot-style rule is able to do this for any network
satisfying Assumption III.1 as indicated next.
Theorem VI.4. Let Assumptions III.1 and III.4 hold. Then, the
beliefs generated by the update rule (32) with infinite evidence
converge in probability to:
lim
𝑡→∞𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃) = 0 if ∃𝑗 ∈M s.t. 𝜋𝑗𝜃 ̸= 𝜋𝑗𝜃* . (45)
Proof. The beliefs at time 𝑡 can be expressed in matrix-vector
form as
𝜇𝑡(𝜃) = L𝜃(𝜔𝑡)A · · ·L𝜃(𝜔2)AL𝜃(𝜔1)A𝜇0(𝜃)
=
𝑡∏︁
𝜏=𝑇+1
(L𝜃(𝜔𝜏 )A)𝜇𝑇 (𝜃),
where L𝜃(𝜔𝜏 ) = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(ℓ1𝜃(n1𝜏−1, 𝜔1𝜏 |r1𝜃), ...,
ℓ𝑚𝜃(n𝑚𝜏−1, 𝜔𝑚𝜏 |r𝑚𝜃)), the initial belief 𝜇0(𝜃) = 1
and
𝜇𝑇 (𝜃) =
𝑇∏︁
𝜏=1
(L𝜃(𝜔𝜏 )A)1.
For any finite value of 𝑇 , it is clear that 𝜇𝑇 (𝜃) is finite
because it can be bounded by a finite number since the norms
‖L𝜃(𝜔𝜏 )‖ ≤ (𝑇 + 𝐾 − 1) for 1 6 𝜏 6 𝑇 via Lemma V.7
and ‖A‖ = 1. From Lemma V.2 condition 2, it is known that
for any 𝜖 > 0 and 𝛿 > 0 there exist a finite 𝑇 such that
with probability at least 1− 𝛿, ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝜏 , 𝜔𝑖𝜏 |r𝑖𝜃) ≤ 𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝜏 𝜃𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝜏 𝜃* + 𝜖
and 𝐸𝜃
*
[ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝜏 , 𝜔𝑖𝜏 |r𝑖𝜃)] ≤ 1 + 𝜖. Let 𝐸𝜃*𝜒𝜈 [·] represent the
expectation over the private signals for specific segments in
time so that 𝜒𝜈 = {𝜔𝑖𝜏 |𝑖 ∈ M, 𝜏 = 𝑇 + 𝑍1 + 𝜈𝑍2 for
𝑍1 = 1, . . . , 𝜈 − 1 and 𝑍2 = 0, 1, . . . }. Now because all
the elements of the A and L𝜃 matrices are non-negative, for
𝑍 > 0 with probability at least 1− 𝛿
𝐸𝜃
*
𝜒𝜈 [𝜇𝑇+𝜈𝑍(𝜃)]
= L𝜃(𝜔𝑇+𝜈𝑍)A
𝑇+𝜈𝑍−1∏︁
𝜏=𝑇+𝜈(𝑍−1)+1
(︁
𝐸𝜃
*
[L𝜃(𝜔𝜏 )]A
)︁
·L𝜃(𝜔𝑇+𝜈(𝑍−1))A
𝑇+𝜈(𝑍−1)−1∏︁
𝜏=𝑇+𝜈(𝑍−2)+1
(︁
𝐸𝜃
*
[L𝜃(𝜔𝜏 )]A
)︁
L𝜃(𝜔𝑇+𝜈(𝑍−2))A · · ·L𝜃(𝜔𝑇+𝜈)A
·
𝑇+𝜈−1∏︁
𝜏=𝑇++1
(︁
𝐸𝜃
*
[L𝜃(𝜔𝜏 )]A
)︁
𝜇𝑇 (𝜃)
≤ (1 + 𝜖)𝑍(𝜈−1)L𝜃(𝜔𝑇+𝜈𝑍)A𝜈L𝜃(𝜔𝑇+𝜈(𝑍−1))A𝜈
· · ·L𝜃(𝜔𝑇+𝜈)A𝜈𝜇𝑇 (𝜃).
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Fig. 3. Example of the network structure considered in the numerical analysis.
By Lemma 5 in [27], each element of A𝜈 is bounded above
by [A𝜈 ]𝑖𝑗 ≤ 1𝑚 +
√
2𝑚𝜆𝜈 . Thus,
𝐸𝜃
*
𝜒𝜈 [𝜇𝑇+𝜈𝑍(𝜃)]
≤ (1 + 𝜖)𝑍(𝜈−1)
(︁
1 +
√
2𝑚𝜆𝜈
)︁𝑍
L𝜃(𝜔𝑇+𝜈𝑍)
1
𝑚
11′L𝜃(𝜔𝑇+𝜈(𝑍−1))
1
𝑚
11′ · · ·L𝜃(𝜔𝑇+𝜈) 1
𝑚
11′𝜇𝑇 (𝜃)
= (1 + 𝜖)𝑍(𝜈−1)
(︁
1 +
√
2𝑚𝜆𝜈
)︁𝑍
·
𝑍∏︁
𝑧=1
(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔𝑖(𝑇+𝜈𝑧))
)︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜇𝑖𝑇 (𝜃)L𝜃(𝜔𝑇+𝜈)1.
Since ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜔𝑖𝑡|r𝑖𝜃) = 𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝑡𝜃𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝑡𝜃* as 𝑡 → ∞, then
log
(︀
1
𝑚
∑︀𝑚
𝑖=1 ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜔𝑖𝑡|r𝑖𝜃)
)︀
= log
(︁
1
𝑚
∑︀𝑚
𝑖=1
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝑡𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖𝑡𝜃*
)︁
a.s.. Using the fact that log(1 + 𝑥) 6 𝑥 for 𝑥 > 0, it is easy
to see that for 𝑇 sufficiently large, the log expected belief can
be bounded with probability at least 1− 𝛿 as
log
(︁
𝐸𝜃
*
𝜒𝜈 [𝜇𝑇+𝜈𝑍(𝜃)]
)︁
≤ 𝑍
(︁
𝜈𝜖+
√
2𝑚𝜆𝜈
)︁
+
𝑍∑︁
𝑧=1
log
(︃
1
𝑚
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖(𝑇+𝜈𝑧)𝜃
𝜋𝑖𝜔𝑖(𝑇+𝜈𝑧)𝜃*
)︃
+ 𝐶,
where 𝐶 = log
(︀
1
𝑚
∑︀𝑚
𝑖=1 𝜇𝑖𝑇 (𝜃)
)︀
+
log (ℓ𝜃(n𝑖𝑇+𝜈−1𝜔𝑖𝑇+𝜈 |r𝑖𝜃)) is a finite constant. By the
law of large numbers for sufficiently large 𝑍,
log
(︁
𝐸𝜃
*
𝜒𝜈 [𝜇𝑇+𝜈𝑍(𝜃)]
)︁
≤ 𝑍
(︁
(𝜈 − 1)𝜖+
√
2𝑚𝜆𝜈 −𝐷𝐶𝐴(Π𝜃* ||Π𝜃)
)︁
+ 𝐶.
Since the centralized average divergence is positive as 𝜋𝑖𝜃 ̸=
𝜋𝑖𝜃* for at least one agent 𝑖, 𝜖 and 𝜈 can be chosen
such that 𝜈𝜖 +
√
2𝑚𝜆𝜈 < 𝐷𝐶𝐴(Π𝜃* ||Π𝜃) and the bounds
diverges to −∞ with probability at least 1 − 𝛿. Thus,
lim𝑍→∞𝐸𝜃
*
𝜒𝜈 [𝜇𝑇+𝜈𝑍(𝜃)]
𝑃→ 0. Finally, the beliefs are always
bounded below by zero, and so convergence of the expectation
to zero also implies that 𝜇𝑡(𝜃)
𝑃→∞.
In summary, DeGroot-style social learning with finite prior
evidence does not in general lead to the same beliefs as
the centralized uncertain likelihood ratio, unlike the learning
rule in (1). Nevertheless for infinite evidence, learning is
still achieved. For the general case as the uncertain update
ℓ𝑖𝜃(n𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜔𝑖𝑡|r𝑖𝜃) transitions from a certain-like update to
a value of one more slowly as more prior evidence 𝑅𝑖𝜃 is
available, more prior evidence leads to a larger chance that
TABLE I
SET OF HYPOTHESES Θ
𝜃1 𝜃2 𝜃3 𝜃4
𝜋𝑖𝜃 {0.6, 0.4} {0.55, 0.45} {0.5, 0.5} {0.4, 0.6}
𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝜋𝑖𝜃||𝜋𝑖𝜃* ) 0 0.0051 0.0204 0.0811
beliefs using the DeGroot-style rule will converge to a value
greater than one when 𝜃 = 𝜃* and a value less than one when
𝜃 ̸= 𝜃*. The experiments in Section VII empirically show that
the interpretation of the beliefs as a uncertain likelihood ratio
via Definition IV.3 is still meaningful even though it is less so
than for the social aggregation rule given by (1).
VII. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
Next, we present a simulation study of a group of 𝑚 = 20
agents applying the proposed algorithms to empirically vali-
date the results. In this study, we considered that the agents
are socially connected according to an undirected random
geometric graph shown in Figure 3. The weights of the
adjacency matrix were constructed using a lazy metropolis
matrix [27] to ensure that the network is doubly stochastic.
Then, we considered three scenarios based on the amount
of prior evidence randomly collected within the following
categories: Low, i.e., 𝑅𝑖𝜃 ∈ [0, 100], High, i.e., 𝑅𝑖𝜃 ∈
[1000, 10000], and Infinite, i.e., 𝑅𝑖𝜃 → ∞. Within each
scenario, each agent randomly selects 𝑅𝑖𝜃 and collects a set of
prior evidence for each hypothesis 𝜃 ∈ Θ = {𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3, 𝜃4},
where the parameters of each hypothesis are shown in Table I.
Then, each learning algorithm is simulated for 𝑁 = 50 Monte
Carlo runs, where the amount of prior evidence, the set of
prior evidence, and the measurement sequence is randomly
generated during each run.
First, we present the agents’ beliefs for both learning rules
in Figure 4 for a single Monte Carlo run. These figures
show that the amount of prior evidence directly effects the
point of convergence of both learning rules. As the evidence
increases, the point of convergence increases for 𝜃1 = 𝜃*
and decreases for 𝜃 ̸= 𝜃*. Additionally, the log-linear beliefs
with finite evidence are converging to (
∏︀𝑚
𝑗=1
̃︀Λ𝑗𝜃) 1𝑚 , while the
DeGroot beliefs are converging to something larger as stated
in Theorem III.6 and Lemma VI.1 respectively. This indicates
that we could select a threshold that allows for accurate
inference with log-linear. However, this is not necessarily the
case for the DeGroot model since the beliefs can converge to
a value > 1, as seen for 𝜃2. The properties of the DeGroot
learning rule requires further study as future work.
Furthermore, these figures show that when the agents are
certain, learning occurs as stated in Corollaries V.5.1, V.6,
and VI.1.1 and Theorem VI.4. Additionally, we can see that
the certain beliefs generated by the DeGroot rule decrease to
0 at a slower rate than the log-linear beliefs as indicated in
Lemma VI.3.
Next, we studied error statistics to validate the results pre-
sented in the previous sections, as seen in Tables II, III, and IV.
First, we consider the maximum error between the uncertain
likelihood ratio and the asymptotic uncertain likelihood ratio,
i.e., 𝑒Λ𝑡(𝜃) = max𝑖∈ℳ,𝑚𝑐∈{1,...,𝑁} |Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑇,𝑚𝑐) − ̃︀Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑚𝑐)|,
to empirically validate Lemma IV.4 as seen in Table II. Note
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Fig. 4. Belief evolution of the Log-linear (1) and DeGroot (32) update rules for hypotheses 𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3, and 𝜃4.
TABLE II
MAXIMUM ERROR STATISTICS FOR THE UNCERTAIN LIKELIHOOD RATIO.
𝑒Λ𝑡 (𝜃)
Time step 𝑇 = 103 𝑇 = 106
L
ow
𝜃1 2.27◇ 0.045◇
𝜃2 7.39◇ 0.060◇
𝜃3 11.15◇ 0.086◇
𝜃4 100.93◇ 0.125◇
H
ig
h
𝜃1 267.91◇ 0.557◇
𝜃2 23.28 0.424
𝜃3 7.64 1.2e-5
𝜃4 2.2e-12 0.00*
In
fin
ite
𝜃1 n/a◇ n/a◇
𝜃2 25.38 0.00*
𝜃3 0.366 0.00*
𝜃4 1.3e-16 0.00*
◇Values are normalized by ̃︀Λ𝑖𝜃
*Values are less than 10−16
that we have normalized the values when the beliefs converge
to a value greater than 1, while we do not normalize the values
when the beliefs are converging to a value close to 0 to avoid
divide by 0 singularities.
These results show that as time increases, the error decreases
significantly, suggesting that the uncertain likelihood ratio
is converging to ̃︀Λ𝑖𝜃. Then, as the KL divergence and the
amount of evidence increases, the error for hypotheses 𝜃 ̸= 𝜃*
further decreases until the error is < 10−16, while the error
slightly increases for hypotheses 𝜃1. This is because ̃︀Λ𝑖𝜃1
increases which requires additional time steps for the uncertain
likelihood ratio to reach the convergence point. Furthermore,
we cannot compute the error for a certain likelihood ratio of
𝜃1 since ̃︀Λ𝑖𝜃1 is diverging to infinity. However, the median
ratio Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑇 = 106)/Λ𝑖𝜃(𝑇 = 103) = 31.55, indicating that
the likelihood ratios are diverging to infinity.
The second error statistic shows that the agents
converge to a consensus belief, i.e., 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝜇𝑡 (𝜃) =
max𝑖∈ℳ,𝑚𝑐∈{1,..,𝑁} |𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃,𝑚𝑐) − ?¯?𝑇 (𝜃,𝑚𝑐)|, where
?¯?𝑇 (𝜃,𝑚𝑐) =
1
𝑚
∑︀𝑚
𝑗=1 𝜇𝑗𝑡(𝜃,𝑚𝑐) is the average belief of
the agents during the Monte Carlo run 𝑚𝑐. These results
are shown for the log-linear and DeGroot-style learning
TABLE III
MAXIMUM ERROR STATISTICS FOR THE LOG-LINEAR UPDATE RULE.
𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝜇𝑡 (𝜃) 𝑒
𝑐𝑒𝑛
𝜇𝑡
(𝜃)
Time step 𝑇 = 103 𝑇 = 106 𝑇 = 103 𝑇 = 106
L
ow
𝜃1 0.072◇ 6.1𝑒− 5◇ 0.144◁ 3.9𝑒− 3◁
𝜃2 0.086◇ 1.2𝑒− 4◇ 0.267◁ 5.6𝑒− 3◁
𝜃3 0.132◇ 1.1𝑒− 4◇ 0.403◁ 8.8𝑒− 3◁
𝜃4 0.236◇ 1.6𝑒− 4◇ 1.001◁ 1.7𝑒− 2◁
H
ig
h
𝜃1 0.241◇ 6.5𝑒− 4◇ 0.802◁ 0.132◁
𝜃2 1.477 1.6e-11 0.239 2.1e-14
𝜃3 6.3e-5 0.00* 7.2e-7 0.00*
𝜃4 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
In
fin
ite
𝜃1 0.340◇ 9.3𝑒− 3◇ 𝑛/𝑎◁ 𝑛/𝑎◁
𝜃2 0.504 0 0.105 0
𝜃3 8.7e-7 0 9.3e-8 0
𝜃4 0.00* 0 0.00* 0
◇Values are normalized by ?¯?𝑇 (𝜃)
◁Values are normalized by (
∏︀𝑚
𝑖=1
̃︀Λ𝑖𝜃)1/𝑚
*Values are less than 10−16
rules in Tables III and IV respectively. Similar to 𝑒Λ𝑡(𝜃),
we normalized the results where the beliefs converge to a
value greater than 1. These tables show that as the number of
time steps increases, the error between the agents decreases
significantly, thus suggesting that the agents are forming a
consensus belief with both rules. Furthermore, it can be seen
that the errors between the log-linear and DeGroot beliefs are
similar, which suggests that the learning rules are correlated.
Finally, Tables III and IV show the error between the
agents’ beliefs and the centralized uncertain likelihood
ratio, i.e., 𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝜇𝑡 (𝜃) = max𝑖∈ℳ,𝑚𝑐∈{1,...,𝑁} |𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃,𝑚𝑐) −
(
∏︀𝑚
𝑗=1
̃︀Λ𝑗𝜃(𝑚𝑐)) 1𝑚 |, to empirically validate Theorem III.6
and Lemma VI.1. Similar to the previous results, we have
normalized the values where the beliefs converge to a value
greater than 1. The results for the log-linear rule indicate
that the beliefs are converging to the centralized uncertain
likelihood ratio, while the DeGroot beliefs are converging to a
value much larger. When the agents are certain, both learning
rules result in beliefs that are converging to 0 for hypotheses
𝜃 ̸= 𝜃*. Although we cannot evaluate this result for 𝜃1, we can
see that the median of the ratio of beliefs 𝜇𝑖106(𝜃1)/𝜇𝑖103(𝜃1)
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TABLE IV
MAXIMUM ERROR STATISTICS FOR THE DEGROOT-STYLE UPDATE RULE.
𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝜇𝑡 (𝜃) 𝑒
𝑐𝑒𝑛
𝜇𝑡
(𝜃)
Time step 𝑇 = 103 𝑇 = 106 𝑇 = 103 𝑇 = 106
L
ow
𝜃1 0.072◇ 6.1𝑒− 5◇ 5.497◁ 5.638◁
𝜃2 0.081◇ 1.2𝑒− 4◇ 5.492◁ 5.850◁
𝜃3 0.138◇ 1.1𝑒− 4◇ 27.69 25.73
𝜃4 0.243◇ 1.6𝑒− 4◇ 25.73 25.68
H
ig
h
𝜃1 0.266◇ 6.5𝑒− 4◇ 19.80◁ 111.52◁
𝜃2 0.751◇ 4.7𝑒− 3◇ 694.79 1.0e4
𝜃3 1.761◇ 9.4𝑒− 3◇ 2.4e3 687.76
𝜃4 132.43 1.8e-5 269.21 1.5e-3
In
fin
ite
𝜃1 0.371◇ 9.3𝑒− 3◇ 𝑛/𝑎◁ 𝑛/𝑎◁
𝜃2 765.33 0.00* 2.0e3 0.00*
𝜃3 1.75e3 0.00* 3.8e3 0.00*
𝜃4 36.91 0.00* 74.41 0.00*
◇Values are normalized by ?¯?𝑇 (𝜃)
◁Values are normalized by (
∏︀𝑚
𝑖=1
̃︀Λ𝑖𝜃)1/𝑚
*Values are less than 10−16
is 33.03 and 880.90 for log-linear and DeGroot respectively,
indicating that the beliefs are diverging to infinity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This work presents the properties of uncertain models in
non-Bayesian social learning theory where a group of agents
are collaborating together to identify the unknown ground truth
hypothesis. Uncertainty arises in many situations where an
agent cannot acquire enough prior evidence about a hypothesis
to develop precise statistical models. To accommodate for
uncertainty, we derived an approximate statistical model for
each hypothesis based on the partial information available to
a single agent and studied the convergence properties of a
group of agents that compute a belief for each hypothesis using
a log-linear update rule. We found that when the agents are
uncertain, the group forms a consensus belief, albeit different
than traditional social beliefs. However, when the agents are
certain, the beliefs generated using our uncertain models allow
for learning and achieves results consistent with the literature.
We then found that agents can also learn in the certain
condition with a DeGroot-style rule, but cannot quantify the
convergence point in the uncertain condition. Furthermore, the
beliefs generated using the DeGroot-style rule converge at a
rate much slower than the log-linear rule.
As a future work, we will study the effects of malicious
agents where preliminary results are presented in [49]. Build-
ing on analysis of DeGroot-style rules, we will aim to quantify
their convergence point as well as those of other aggregation
rules. Additionally, we aim to understand how the uncertain
likelihood ratio test trades off type I and II errors as a function
of prior evidence.
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